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ARTICLE




Chevron deference is at the height of its powers in refugee and
asylum cases, with the highest possible human consequences. Why
does the Supreme Court seem so comfortable with Chevron
deference in asylum cases when it has been reluctant to defer to
the government in other kinds of deportation cases? More to the
point, is this deference justified? There are cogent arguments
justifying more deference in asylum cases than in other kinds of
deportation cases. These arguments rest to a great extent on the
premise that greater political accountability is a good thing when
interpreting a statute. Yet in a highly politicized environment,
political accountability is achieved at the expense of legal stability.
Recently, some circuit courts have used arbitrary-and-capricious
review as a limitation on Chevron deference, suggesting
reservations about allowing an administration to radically depart
from past interpretations of the law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Chevron deference is at the height of its powers in refugee and
asylum cases, with the highest possible human consequences.
Important curtailments on eligibility for asylum that began under
President Obama and accelerated under President Trump have
largely survived judicial challenge because courts have been
willing to extend maximum deference to the Executive Branch on
the interpretation of refugee law.1 Even more dramatic limitations
on asylum instituted by the Trump Administration may be
affirmed under Chevron if the Biden Administration does not
change course. The heightened importance of Chevron in refugee
and asylum cases stands in contrast to the diminished importance
that this doctrine has played in other types of immigration cases,
in which the Supreme Court in particular has consistently ignored
government requests for deference when considering legal grounds
1. See discussion infra Part IV.
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for deporting and detaining immigrants.2 The role of deference in
refugee cases illustrates the potential for immigration questions
to scramble the politics surrounding Chevron deference.3
Immigrant rights advocates have joined conservatives in attacking
Chevron and its progeny.4 Meanwhile, Democratic senators
attacked President Trump's judicial nominees for lacking fealty to
Chevron deference.5 The fact that Trump-era immigration
restrictions might end up owing their durability to Chevron
deference is at least a little ironic since in its judicial nominations,
the Trump Administration had been portrayed as an
arch-opponent of the Chevron doctrine.6
At the moment this Article is being finalized in early 2021, the
transition from Trump to Biden has put the future of American
immigration policy into considerable flux. But despite this turmoil,
some clear patterns have emerged in how the Supreme Court uses
Chevron in immigration cases. The Supreme Court has avoided
meaningful application of Chevron deference in two key types of
immigration cases: grounds of removal and immigration
2. See Michael Kagan, Chevron's Liberty Exception, 104 IOWA L. REV. 491, 512, 518,
524-25, 535 (2019).
3. Compare Brief of Amicus Curiae Senator Sheldon Whitehouse in Support of
Respondent at 2, 19, Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (No. 18-15) (argument from a
Democratic senator that attempts to undermine deference to administrative agencies are
"part of a larger strategy to disable public interest regulation"), with Brief for Amici Curiae
The National Immigrant Justice Center and the American Immigration Lawyers
Association in Support of Petitioner at 1-2, 26-30, Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019)
(No. 18-15) [hereinafter Brief of NIJC/AILA] (argument from immigrant advocacy
organizations that the Supreme Court is right to reconsider aspects of deference to agencies
and that deference poses heightened problems in immigration cases).
4. See Brief of NIJC/AILA, supra note 3, at 20, 26-30 (arguing against Auer
deference).
5. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Gorsuch Nomination Puts Spotlight on Agency Powers,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/business/dealbook/g
orsuch-nomination-puts-spotlight-on-agency-powers.html [https://perma.cc/2QCN-R5DX];
Dianne Feinstein, Opinion, Why I'm Voting 'No' on Brett Kavanaugh's Supreme Court
Nomination, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2018, 4:15 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinionL/op-ed/1
a-oe-feinstein-kavanaugh-hearings-20180916-story.html [https://perma.cc/56TF-AFD7].
6. See, e.g., Michael McConnell, Kavanaugh and the "Chevron Doctrine," HOOVER
INST. (July 30, 2018), https://www.hoover.org/research/kavanaugh-and-chevron-doctrine [h
ttps://perma.cc/PM5D-TLAF]; Joshua A. Geltzer, Opinion, Trump's Supreme Court Might
Overturn a Doctrine, but That Won't Destroy the 'Administrative State,' L.A. TIMES (Aug. 5,
2018, 4:05 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-geltzer-kavanaugh-administr
ative-state-20180805-story.html [https://perma.cc/6N6P-XL5Z]; Henning, supra note 5;
Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Agencies Decide Law? Doctrine May Be Tested at Gorsuch
Hearing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/14/business/dealbo
ok/neil-gorsuch-chevron-deference.html [https://perma.cc/533C-7G8S].
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detention.7 The Court has never explicitly explained this as a rule,
but the pattern is clear, and it is consistent with the general
principle that judicial deference is inappropriate when physical
liberty is at stake.8 Or as several authors have put it: "Deportation
is different."9 And yet, Chevron deference has exerted a powerful
and consistent influence on a closely related area of law that, in
practice, effectively determines whether tens of thousands of
people are deported every year: eligibility for asylum.10 Recent
decisions by President Trump's Attorneys General to narrow
asylum protections, followed by new regulations limiting asylum,
rely on this deference and have been testing how far the courts are
actually willing to go with it."
One of the earliest invocations of Chevron deference by the
Supreme Court was an asylum case, I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
and it remains a seminal case in the field of asylum law. 12 But in
many ways, the full importance of Chevron in asylum cases has
become clearer in recent years at the circuit court level. This can
be seen in cases debating the nexus clause of the refugee
definition, a provision that effectively means that asylum-seekers
will be denied protection and deported even when there is no doubt
7. See Kagan, supra note 2, at 524-25, 534-35; Michael Kagan, Chevron Goes
Missing in an Immigration Case. Again., YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Mar. 19,
2019) [hereinafter Kagan, Chevron Goes Missing], https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-go
es-missing-in-an-immigration-case-again/ [https://perma.cc/N7FH-ALP7].
8. Kagan, supra note 2, at 532; Kagan, Chevron Goes Missing, supra note 7.
9. Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1332
(2011); e.g., Patrick Glen, Response to Walker on Chevron Deference and Mellouli v. Lynch,
YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 10, 2015), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/respo
nse-to-walker-on-chevron-deference-and-mellouli-v-lynch-by-patrick-glen/ [https://perma.c
c/6U2U-G4RE] (discussing the possibility of a "deportation-is-different" explanation for the
Court's reluctance with regard to Chevron); Michael Kagan, Chevron's Immigration
Exception, Revisited, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 10, 2016), https://www
.yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-s-immigration-exception-revisited-by-michael-kagan/ [https://per
ma.cc/F2MY-9CK5] (discussing the role of Chevron in immigration cases and advocating
for a "deportation is different" theory); Christopher J. Walker, The "Scant Sense" Exception
to Chevron Deference in Mellouli v. Lynch, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June
2, 2015), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-scant-sense-exception-to-chevron-deference-in-m
ellouli-v-lynch-by-chris-walker/ [https://perma.cc/932E-BKZL] (discussing the possibility
that the Roberts Court may be reluctant to give deference in certain deportation cases).
10. See Kagan, supra note 2, at 520, 537-39 (showing the Supreme Court has been
consistently more willing to apply Chevron in relief from removal cases, especially asylum);
The Difference Between Asylum and Withholding of Removal, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Oct.
6, 2020), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/asylum-withholding-of-re
moval [https://perma.ccIG6BF-KJSR]. But see Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121,
2129 (2018) (Auto, J., dissenting) (complaining that the Court had ignored Chevron in an
immigration case that did not concern deportation or detention).
11. See discussion infra Part III.
12. INS. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 425, 488 (1987); see Kagan, supra note 2,
at 517.
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that they are in grave danger.13 The government has prevailed in
much of this litigation by relying on Chevron deference.14 Close
reading hints that judges in some of these cases have had doubts
about the interpretations of the asylum statute offered by the
Board of Immigration Appeals but have affirmed removal orders
because of deference to the agency.15 In other words, these are
cases in which the Chevron revolution is really happening and
with the highest possible stakes.16 Lives are literally at risk.
This Article explores whether Chevron deference really makes
sense in refugee cases. It joins several others that have reassessed
the role of Chevron in immigration cases. In particular, Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia and Christopher J. Walker have recently
argued for a limitation on Chevron deference based on a process
question.17 They argue that justifications for deference are
particularly weak in the context of immigration adjudication.18
Instead, they argue that Chevron would be appropriate when the
Attorney General interprets the Immigration and Nationality Act
through rulemaking.19 This Article addresses the problem by
focusing primarily on the substantive subject matter, rather than
the process by which an agency interprets a statute. Whether
adopted through adjudication or rulemaking, should courts really
defer to the Executive Branch on the interpretation of asylum law?
13. See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES § 5:1 (2020 ed.)
("The refugee definition requires that persecution or fear of persecution be 'for reasons of
or, under U.S. law, 'on account of one of the iterated grounds: race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.").
14. See, e.g., Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming the
BIA's "particularity" and "social distinction" requirements for membership in a "particular
social group" under Chevron); S.E.R.L. v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 894 F.3d 535, 549-50 (3d Cir.
2018).
15. See, e.g., S.E.R.L., 894 F.3d at 550 (noting that critiques of the BIA interpretation
"raise legitimate concerns ... [but] notwithstanding our concerns, we conclude that the
requirements are reasonable and warrant Chevron deference").
16. Contra Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead, Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
1867, 1867 (2015) ("Despite all the attention, ... the 'Chevron revolution' never quite
happens.").
17. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia & Christopher J. Walker, The Case Against Chevron
Deference in Immigration Adjudication, 70 DUKE L.J. 1197, 1223-24 (2021).
18. Id. at 1201, 1217-23. Wadhia and Walker take inspiration for their argument
from a broader critique of Chevron deference in administrative adjudication offered by
Kristin E. Hickman and Aaron L. Nielson. Id. at 1201; see also Kristin E. Hickman & Aaron
L. Nielson, Narrowing Chevron's Domain, 70 DUKE L.J. 931, 964, 981 (2021).
19. Wadhia & Walker, supra note 17, at 1234, 1239-40.
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This question is urgent.20 The efforts of President Trump's
Attorneys General to narrow eligibility for asylum may determine
the fates of tens of thousands of asylum-seekers fleeing gang
violence in Central America.21 It was clear that the Department of
Justice intended to defend these efforts to restrict asylum through
heavy reliance on Chevron.22 In perhaps the most important
change to the American understanding of what it means to be a
refugee, Attorney General William Barr issued a decision
purporting to eliminate family-based persecution as a basis for
asylum.23 Barr acknowledged openly that this change went
against a well-developed body of circuit court caselaw,24 but he
emphasized the congressionally delegated power given to him to
change interpretations of the law under Chevron and Brand X.25
As if to answer the possible complaint that Chevron is ill-fitted to
statutory interpretations issued through administrative
adjudication, during the last weeks of the Trump Administration,
the Department of Justice codified its new restrictive view of
asylum law in regulations.26 Even if the incoming Biden
Administration undoes these new rules, they are a sign that as
immigration policy has become more volatile, presidents are more
likely to push their authority to radically reshape asylum law
through the administrative process, especially if the courts remain
highly deferential in this area of law.
During the Trump years, some courts have used
arbitrary-and-capricious review to restrain the political instability
that may result from a straightforward application of Chevron
deference. Most notably, as I explain in Part VIII, the D.C. Circuit
held that one of the Trump Administration's key decisions limiting
20. See Maureen A. Sweeney, Enforcing/Protection: The Danger of Chevron in
Refugee Act Cases, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 130 (2019) ('"This question of deference can mean
the difference between lifesaving protection and deportation back to danger.").
21. See Katie Benner & Caitlin Dickerson, Sessions Says Domestic and Gang Violence
Are Not Grounds for Asylum, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06
/11/us/politics/sessions-domestic-violence-asylum.html [https://perma.cc/87X4-ULBV]. See
generally Fatma Marouf, Becoming Unconventional: Constricting the 'Particular Social
Group' Ground for Asylum, 44 N.C. J. INT'L L. 489 (2019).
22. See, e.g., S.E.R.L. v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 894 F.3d 535, 549 (3d Cir. 2018).
23. Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- II), 27 I. & N. Dec. 581, 596 (Att'y Gen. 2019).
24. Id. at 589 ("I recognize that a number of courts of appeals have issued opinions
that recognize a family-based social group as a 'particular social group' under the asylum
statute.").
25. Id. at 592.
26. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and




asylum eligibility would pass under Chevron, but nevertheless
failed arbitrary-and-capricious review because it significantly
departed from well-established policy, without adequate
explanation.27 Other circuits have declined to reach this
conclusion, but they have done so by interpreting new policies in
narrow terms, thus minimizing the degree to which they change
the law and allowing them to survive arbitrary-and-capricious
review.28 This new interest in arbitrary-and-capricious review,
which has been encouraged by Chief Justice Roberts and the
Supreme Court, will be an important trend to watch.29 It seems to
signal an uneasiness with the legal instability that results from
deference doctrines like Chevron.
So why does the Supreme Court seem so comfortable with
Chevron deference in asylum cases when it has been reluctant to
defer to the government on other kinds of deportation cases? More
to the point, is this deference justified? The applicability of
Chevron deference may determine whether people in danger of
mortal harm receive protection. It also offers broader lessons about
the relative strength of various justifications for this central
doctrine in modern administrative law. In particular, it shines a
light on the political accountability rationale, which is often
offered as a justification for deference to the Executive Branch.
Heavy reliance on the political branches to interpret a statute in a
highly partisan policy arena, like immigration, is likely to lead to
significant instability in statutory interpretation and may
undermine important jurisprudential principles.
The purpose of this Article will be two-fold.
First, it will explore how Chevron deference appears to have
had a significant impact in asylum law. It will identify the reasons
why asylum applications may be different from other cases in
which deportation is at stake. There are formalistic differences,
beginning with the fact that asylum is a form of relief from
removal, not a ground for removal. There may also be different
concerns at play in this area of law, which may make agency
expertise or political accountability more important.
Second, the Article will reassess whether deference in asylum
cases is warranted. This assessment builds, in part, on the theory
that the Supreme Court has had good reason to not apply
27. See infra Part VIII.
28. Id.




deference in deportation and detention cases.30 Asylum cases are
in every practical sense about deportation, and if anything, the
stakes for the immigrant are even higher in a case where there is
a fear of severe human rights violations. This is not the case in all
immigration cases that reach the federal courts.31 There is also
good reason to doubt that the Attorney General has actually
handled this area of law in a manner that supports a claim for
deference. As Judge Posner wrote, "Deference is earned; it is not a
birthright."32 And yet, as we will see, there are cogent arguments
justifying more deference in asylum cases than in other kinds of
deportation cases. These arguments rest to a great extent on the
premise that greater political accountability is a good thing when
interpreting a statute. Yet that proposition in effect encourages
politicization of immigration adjudication, a phenomenon that is
already happening, has proven to be highly controversial, and may
pose serious problems.
Part II summarizes, based on previous research, patterns in
the Supreme Court's use of Chevron deference in immigration
cases, showing how asylum cases are treated differently than
deportation and detention cases. Part III offers a brief primer for
the uninitiated on the basic vocabulary of asylum and refugee law,
especially as it relates to the definition of a "particular social
group" and the requirement that a refugee must be in danger for
a certain reason. Part IV looks at deference in circuit court asylum
caselaw, showing that Chevron has proven to be extremely
influential in these cases. Part V assesses possible rationales for
deference in asylum cases and concludes that political
accountability and presidential prerogatives over foreign affairs
offer the strongest justification for deference in asylum law. Part
VI highlights the dilemma posed by politicization of
administrative adjudication as a means of interpreting statutes,
including assessing the role of arbitrary-and-capricious review as
an additional limitation on executive authority. Part VII asks the
central question: Is politicization a virtue or a vice? Part VIII
examines the inclination of some courts, including the D.C.
Circuit, to impose arbitrary-and-capricious review on top of
Chevron deference, in order to reduce the legal instability that
comes with enhanced political accountability.
30. See Kagan, supra note 2, at 532.
31. Cf. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 55-56, 75 (2014) (applying
Chevron deference in the denial of a family-sponsored visa application).
32. Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 819, 821 (7th Cir. 2007).
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II. PATTERNS OF CHEVRON DEFERENCE IN IMMIGRATION
APPEALS
Chevron deference involves two famous steps when an
administrative agency interprets a statute that it administers.33
The first asks whether the intent of Congress is clear from the
statute. Second, "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute."34 The most prominent justification for this deference is
that it respects congressional intent to delegate interpretation of
a law to the agency responsible for implementing it.35 But the
Supreme Court has offered other rationales as well. One is
political accountability. The central idea here is that interpreting
statutes often requires making policy choices, and these policy
choices are better left to the Executive Branch than to the courts.36
Another justification for deference is the proposition that agencies
have technical expertise that helps them interpret complex
statutes.37
Deference by a court to an executive agency on a matter of
statutory interpretation ought to require a compelling
justification. Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act
assigns courts the responsibility to resolve "all relevant questions
of law" and "constitutional and statutory provisions."38 Justice
Scalia, a prominent proponent of Chevron deference for much of
his career on the Supreme Court, warned early on that "[i]t is not
immediately apparent why a court should ever accept the
33. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)
("When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions.").
34. Id. at 842-43.
35. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 229 (2001) ("We hold that
administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to
make rules carrying the force of law . . .. Congress . .. may not have expressly delegated
authority or responsibility to implement a particular provision or fill a particular gap.").
36. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66; Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2326-28, 2369 (2001) (noting that presidents should use the power of
regulatory agencies to achieve policy goals because they can be subject to political
accountability through elections).
37. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 ("Judges are not experts in the field .... "). But see
Kagan, supra note 2, at 501-02 (summarizing critiques of the technical expertise
justification for deference).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
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judgment of an executive agency on a question of law."39 He wrote
that in 1989. Today, it would seem even more urgent to examine
whether there is a good reason for deference because the Supreme
Court seems increasingly unsure about the doctrine. Some
Justices have directly questioned its constitutionality.40 Even
before these doubts surfaced explicitly, it had become clear that
the Supreme Court has been extremely inconsistent in its
application of Chevron deference.41 As Justice Kennedy wrote in
an immigration case in his last term, "[I]t seems necessary and
appropriate to reconsider . .. the premises that underlie Chevron
and how courts have implemented that decision."42
Chevron deference would seem to have particularly strong
foundations in immigration law, a field in which deference to the
Executive Branch predated modern administrative law.43
Congress has explicitly stated in the Immigration and Nationality
Act that the Attorney General's determination on questions of law
"shall be controlling."44 In most cases, the Attorney General
exercises this power through adjudication, either by decisions he
makes himself, or through decisions by the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA). 45 In a 1999 withholding case, the Supreme Court
said, "It is clear that principles of Chevron deference are applicable
to this statutory scheme."46 In 2014, the Court was more emphatic
in a case concerning eligibility for a family-sponsored visa:
"Principles of Chevron deference apply when the BIA interprets
the immigration laws. Indeed, 'judicial deference to the Executive
39. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 512-13 (1989).
40. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) ("Chevron seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the
judicial duty.").
41. See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116
MIcH. L. REV. 1, 19 (2017); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1124-25 (2008); Herz, supra note 16, at 1870.
42. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120-21 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
43. See generally Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545,
551-53 (1990).
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1).
45. See Justin Chasco, Comment, Judge Alberto Gonzales? The Attorney General's
Power to Overturn Board of Immigration Appeals' Decisions, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 363, 375
(2007).
46. INS. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 419, 424 (1999) ("Under the immigration




Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context,'
where decisions about a complex statutory scheme often implicate
foreign relations."47
While the Supreme Court has talked as if Chevron's
application in immigration law is a simple and settled matter, the
Court's actions paint a different picture. There have been at least
four Supreme Court immigration cases decided since 1999 in
which the Court has meaningfully applied Chevron deference.48
But none of these involved grounds of removal or immigration
detention.49 In a recent study, I found that in many decisions
"concerning the BIA's interpretation of criminal grounds of
removal the Supreme Court has simply failed to even mention the
existence of Chevron."50  Meanwhile, in other criminal
grounds-for-removal cases, the Court mentioned Chevron but
avoided actually giving any deference.51 In an immigration case,
Justice Alito complained that the Court was ignoring Chevron as
if it had been overruled "in a secret decision that has somehow
escaped my attention."5 2 It seems that Chevron matters a lot in
some immigration cases but not in others.
Administrative law scholars have long questioned whether
the Supreme Court is consistent in applying Chevron deference
and whether consistency should even be expected. In an oft-cited
study, William N. Eskridge Jr. and Lauren E. Baer found broad
inconsistency across more than 1,000 Supreme Court cases where
Chevron should have been applicable.53  Because of this
inconsistency, Eskridge and others argued that "scholars are being
unrealistic when they demand that the Supreme Court adopt and
consistently apply formal deference regimes."4 Instead, Chevron's
analytical framework offers "flexible rules of thumb or
presumptions deployed by the Justices episodically and not
entirely predictably, rather than binding rules that the Justices
47. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 56-57 (2014) (plurality opinion)
(citations omitted) (quoting Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425).
48. See Kagan, supra note 2, at 520-21 tbl.1.
49. Id. at 519-21.
50. Id. at 524.
51. Id. at 525-26.
52. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121, 2129 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting).
53. Eskridge, Jr. & Baer, supra note 41, at 1124-25; see also Connor N. Raso &
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of
What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLuM. L. REV. 1727, 1765-66
(2010).
54. Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 53, at 1735.
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apply more systematically."15 The Court itself has hinted that it
does not expect itself to be rigorously consistent.66 More recently,
Natalie Salmanowitz and Holger Spamann have raised doubts
about the empirical basis for this skepticism about Supreme Court
consistency.67 In a replication study, they found--contrary to
Eskridge and Baer-that the Court had actually been quite
consistent with Chevron.58 They suggested that the flaw in the
original study was that it ignored whether the parties asked the
Court to apply deference.69 When the cases in which no one asked
for deference in the briefs are removed from the analysis, the
Court appeared to invoke Chevron more reliably.60
My own research is narrower, focusing only on immigration
cases, but it may offer a bridge between these two opposing views
of whether the Supreme Court is consistent in applying Chevron.
First, my study took note of whether the government asked for
Chevron deference and found that this factor did not explain the
Court's failure to apply Chevron in certain types of immigration
cases.61 My research anticipated the type of nuanced analysis
advocated by Salmanowitz and Spamann, but nevertheless found
the following:
In at least seven decisions ... concerning the BIA's
interpretation of criminal grounds of removal the Supreme
Court has simply failed to even mention the existence of
Chevron... . In some cases the Department of Justice did not
ask for deference, usually because there was no published
BIA decision at issue. In another case, the government asked
for deference, but only in a footnote to its brief, and did not
appear to demand Chevron deference specifically. But those
factors cannot explain the pattern. In two cases, Nijhawan v.
Holder and Torres v. Lynch, Board decisions had been
published and the government asked vigorously and at
length for Chevron deference, [yet] the Court still ignored
Chevron entirely in its decision.
6 2
55. Id. at 1766.
56. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015) (Chevron deference is a method
that the court says it "often" applies).
57. Natalie Salmanowitz & Holger Spamann, Does the Supreme Court Really Not
Apply Chevron When It Should?, 57 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 81, 83-85 (2019).
58. Id. at 81, 89 ("Our reexamination of this study finds that the fraction of such cases
is far lower, and indeed closer to zero.").
59. Id. at 83.
60. Id. at 85-86, 89.
61. See Kagan, supra note 2, at 524-25, 527-28 tbl.2.
62. Id. at 524-25 (footnotes omitted).
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I also argue that Eskridge and his colleagues had erred in
concluding that the Court's inconsistency was essentially
idiosyncratic.63 If that were a correct description, then it would be
reasonable to conclude that the Supreme Court applies Chevron,
at best, as a loose set of guiding principles, not as a binding rule.
But what if it is not random? If clear patterns can be detected, they
may help us better understand the situations in which the Justices
feel comfortable with deference, and those where they do not.64 In
other words, we should not be afraid to look for patterns and
significance in the Court's failure to apply Chevron in cases where
it would seem to be relevant.65
Much like Salmanowitz and Spamann, I agree that we need
to pay attention not just to the abstract normative question about
Chevron's applicability in a particular case, but to a longer list of
factors that would make the Court's failure to apply deference
more or less noteworthy.66 As the Justices seem to be growing more
doubtful about Chevron deference, we should pay attention to both
loud anti-Chevron decisions and soft anti-Chevron decisions.67 The
loud ones are decisions where the Court explicitly announced a
limitation on Chevron.68 The major cases exception, for matters of
"deep economic and political significance," in King v. Burwell
would be an obvious example.69 But we should also pay attention
to soft decisions, "where the Supreme Court failed to apply
Chevron when it ostensibly should have mattered or applied it in
such a way as to render the doctrine irrelevant."70 These cases
present themselves in two different ways, both evident in the
Supreme Court's immigration jurisprudence. Sometimes, the
Court simply fails to even mention Chevron, as if it doesn't even
63. Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 53, at 1766. ("Idiosyncrasy in deployment (or
not) of deference regimes is tolerated within the Court.").
64. See Michael Kagan, Loud and Soft Anti-Chevron Decisions, 53 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 37, 40 (2018).
65. See Kent Barnett, Why Bias Challenges to Administrative Adjudication Should
Succeed, 81 MO. L. REV. 1023, 1036-37 (2016).
66. Kagan, supra note 64, at 50 (noting factors such as: "(1) whether the Supreme
Court itself acknowledged lack of statutory clarity; (2) whether lower court judges were
divided on the statutory meaning, providing an objective indication that the statute's
meaning was subject to reasonable disagreement; (3) whether lower courts disagreed with
the agency's interpretation, similarly indicating room for reasonable disagreement;
(4) whether the lower court decision under review applied Chevron; and (5) whether the
government asked for deference to the agency's interpretation").
67. Id. at 47-48.
68. Id.
69. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015).
70. Kagan, supra note 64, at 40, 48.
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exist.71 Other times, the Court mentions Chevron but seems to give
it no real force.72
The mere fact that in a single case the Court ignores Chevron
or does not seem to apply it with full force does not mean much on
its own. Moreover, given that Chevron deference has become a
fraught topic, the Justices might be inclined to avoid it if they can
find another way to decide a case.73 But that does not mean that
Chevron has no relevance, in the sense that the Court might still
turn to it when it really might matter. To paraphrase a line often
attributed to Sigmund Freud, sometimes inconsistency is just
inconsistency.74 Yet if the Court avoids relying on Chevron over
and over again in a specific type of case while relying on it heavily
and regularly in another type of case, then it's not really
inconsistency at all. Instead, the pattern indicates the
circumstances in which the Supreme Court finds Chevron most
applicable and those for which it finds it inappropriate or at least
more fraught.75 Such "soft" cases allow the Supreme Court to
quietly test and refine the appropriate boundaries of the doctrine,
without prematurely stating a rule.
When this kind of nuanced, factor-sensitive analysis is
conducted in immigration cases, we do not find idiosyncrasy.
Instead, we find a pattern. While the Supreme Court has applied
Chevron deference in many types of immigration cases, it has quite
consistently avoided meaningful deference in cases concerning
grounds of removal and detention.76 The typical version of this
case involves a legal immigrant who is convicted of a state criminal
offense, leading to a question of law about whether that conviction
is one of the removable offenses listed in the Immigration and
Nationality Act.77 One theory offered to explain these cases is that
some of these grounds of removal are "dual-use" statutes, since the
same ground of removal may be a civil ground for deportation in
71. Id. at 49.
72. Id.
73. I am indebted to David Rubenstein for this insight.
74. Freud might not have actually said "sometimes a cigar is just a cigar," though the
line is typically attributed to him. See Sometimes a Cigar Is Just a Cigar, QUOTE
INVESTIGATOR, https://quoteinvestigator.com/2011/08/12/just-a-cigar/ [https://perma.cc/4N
JR-ZKG3] (last updated Aug. 12, 2011).
75. See Kagan, supra note 64, at 54-55.
76. See Kagan, supra note 2, at 533-35, 537-39.
77. See, e.g., Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1623 (2016).
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Immigration Court, and also an element of a crime.78 For example,
a conviction that counts as an aggravated felony would allow for
the removal of a legal resident.79 But if a person reentered the
United States after an aggravated felony, it would constitute an
element of a criminal offense as well.80 Perhaps the reason these
deportation cases are treated differently for Chevron purposes is
that Chevron does not apply to elements of a criminal offense and
thus cannot apply to a dual-use statute.8 1
The dual-use theory is elegant, but it does not explain the full
pattern for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has also avoided
meaningful Chevron deference in cases concerning grounds of
removal that are not dual-use.82 This was the case in Mellouli v.
Lynch, for instance, which involved removal for a purported
violation of the Controlled Substances Act but not for an
aggravated felony.83 In that case, the Court mentioned Chevron
but gave no real deference because, it said, the BIA's
interpretation of the statute made "scant sense."84 Second, and
perhaps more important, the Court also avoids Chevron deference
in cases involving immigration detention. This was true in two
cases that are more than a decade old-Zadvydas v. Davis8 and
Clark v. Martinez.86 It was also true in detention cases decided in
2018 and 2019, Jennings v. Rodriguez87 and Nielsen v. Preap.88
Thus, it is no longer enough to say that deportation is different.
Instead, it seems that deportation and detention are both different
for Chevron purposes. I have explained this as a physical liberty
exception to Chevron, on the theory that detention and deportation
78. See Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1027-28 (6th Cir. 2016)
(Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (proposing a dual-application
argument for avoiding Chevron deference), rev'd sub nom. Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions,
137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017).
79. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (defining an aggravated felony); id. § 1227(a)(2)(iii)
(aggravated felony as a ground for removal).
80. Id. § 1326(b)(2); see also id. § 1327.
81. See Esquivel-Quintana, 810 F.3d at 1027-28 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
82. See Kagan, supra note 2, at 529-30.
83. Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1983-84 (2015).
84. Id. at 1989.
85. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682, 689, 700-01 (2001).
86. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 402 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
87. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836 (2018).
88. See Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019) (making no mention of Chevron
deference in a case concerning immigrant detention where the parties had argued




both involve deprivations of physical liberty, and nondeferential
judicial review is especially sacred in this circumstance.89
All of this still leaves Chevron deference very much intact in
a wide range of immigration matters. One variety would be visa
applications, which involve people wanting to come to the United
States or sponsor their relatives to come.90 Another concerns
discretionary relief.91 Another-and the most important for this
Article-are claims for relief from removal, which includes asylum
cases. Asylum law played a role in Chevron's early history with the
1987 decision in INS. v. Cardoza-Fonseca.92 The Court ignored
Chevron (despite the Solicitor General requesting it) in a
subsequent asylum case in 1992, INS. v. Elias-Zacarias.93 But
since then the Court has been more consistent. One of the most
frequently cited invocations of Chevron's applicability in
immigration is an asylum case, INS. v. Aguirre-Aguirre,94 while
another asylum case, Negusie v. Holder, became a vehicle for the
Court to reinforce the ordinary remand rule, which is closely
related to the command that courts defer to the agency on
interpretive matters.95
In sum, the Supreme Court has consistently avoided
meaningful application of Chevron deference in cases concerning
grounds of deportation and detention. By contrast, it has usually
applied deference in other types of immigration cases. The next
parts will describe the outsized influence Chevron has had on
asylum cases in the circuit courts.
III. A BRIEF PRIMER ON ASYLUM
I offer here a brief overview of refugee law in order to provide
context for the role of Chevron in asylum cases. In order to qualify
as a "refugee," and thus in order to win asylum, a noncitizen must
show that she is outside her country of nationality "and is unable
or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of[] that
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
89. See Kagan, supra note 2, at 532.
90. See, e.g., Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 55-56 (2014).
91. See, e.g., Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7, 53 (2011); Holder v. Martinez
Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583, 586, 591 (2012).
92. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987); see also Thomas W. Merrill,
Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 985 (1992).
93. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992); Brief for Petitioner, INS. v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) (No. 90-1342), 1991 WL 11003946, at *23.
94. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 423-25 (1999).
95. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009).
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persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion."96 The refugee
cases at issue in this Article concern the definition of "membership
in a particular social group," which has long been one of the
hardest to interpret phrases in the refugee definition.
There are many high-stakes questions about the United
States' asylum system. The Trump Administration sought to
change a number of policies that are currently the subject of
litigation,97 but I will not attempt to address most of them in this
Article, in part because much of the related litigation is unresolved
as I write this. These issues include the question of whether
asylum-seekers may be forced to wait in Mexico while their
applications are pending,98 whether passing through a third
country before reaching the southern border may be a bar to
asylum,99 and whether entering the country illegally may be a bar
to asylum.100 I will instead focus solely on the legal definition of a
refugee-the core eligibility criteria for asylum. The refugee
definition is routinely contested in petitions for review of orders of
removal filed by immigrants in the circuit courts of appeal. In
these appeals, the Department of Justice has often relied on
Chevron deference to defend limitations on eligibility for
asylum.101
The requirement that a refugee must fear persecution on
account of an enumerated protected ground (race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion) is one of the harshest limitations in asylum law. It means
that a person who is genuinely in danger of severe harm (having
"a well-founded fear of persecution") may be denied protection and
deported because she would not be persecuted for the right
reason.102 Race, religion, nationality, or political opinion all have
their potential interpretive pitfalls, but asylum cases based on
these grounds have tended to be more straightforward. When a
person flees imprisonment because he has participated in
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1); id. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
97. See generally NAT'L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., A TIMELINE OF THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS TO END ASYLUM (2019) https://immigrantustice.org/sites/defau
lt/files/uploaded-files/no-content-type/2019-08/AsylumTimelineAugust2019.pdf [https://p
erma.cc/5TJA-3P5S].
98. Id. at 4.
99. Id. at 3.
100. Id. at 6.
101. See infra Part IV.
102. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see also Anker, supra note 13, § 5:1.
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antigovernment demonstrations, the crux of the case will be
whether the evidence is strong enough that he is genuinely in
danger, but there typically will not be a dispute that this type of
danger would qualify.103 When a person makes an asylum claim
because he says he has converted from one religion to another and
that his government would torture him for doing do so, there may
be doubt about whether he is manufacturing the conversion to
generate an asylum claim, but usually there will not be doubt that
this kind of claim, if credible, should succeed. 104 But when a person
flees gender-based violence or threats from a criminal group, it is
not necessarily enough to show that she is genuinely in danger,
nor that she has already been a victim of grievous abuse.105 These
cases depend on the far more ambiguous category "membership in
a particular social group."106 The results are often strikingly harsh
because it leads judges to effectively say: We know you will be
killed or raped, but not for the right reason. A recent decision by
the Eleventh Circuit illustrates this stark reality:
The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied relief because, although
Perez-Zenteno was beaten and brutally raped and her
daughter kidnapped, she failed to prove that she was
persecuted on account of membership in a statutorily
protected group. The social group offered was neither
sufficiently particular nor socially distinct.. . . Because we
too agree that Perez-Zenteno has failed to establish
membership in a particular social group, as defined by
Congress, and because no nexus has been shown, we hold
that the petition must be denied.107
It is probably no surprise that the law in such cases would be hotly
contested. In these cases, Chevron's fullest potential power may be
seen in action, with the gravest consequences.
Defining "membership in a particular social group" has been
the subject of legal to-and-fro since at least the 1990s, affecting
cases of severe gender-based violence and also violence by criminal
gangs who target families and children, among others. The Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has long struggled to develop a
103. See, e.g., Matter of A-E-M-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1157, 1159-60 (B.I.A. 1998) (noting
that in a political asylum case, the level of risk may be assessed to be less when family
members are not targeted).
104. See Michael Kagan, Refugee Credibility Assessment and the "Religious Imposter"
Problem, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1179, 1182 & n.5 (2010).
105. See Anker, supra note 13, § 5:40.
106. See id.
107. Perez-Zenteno v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 913 F.3d 1301, 1304 (11th Cir. 2019).
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coherent interpretation of "particular social group" and to apply it
consistently.108 From the mid-1980s until 2006, the BIA defined a
social group by fundamental or immutable characteristics.109 The
BIA reached this first understanding by applying a canon of
construction to the statute. Since "particular social group" appears
in a list of other protected grounds, the principle of ejusdem generis
called for interpreting this category to be analogous to race,
religion, nationality, and political opinion." 0 This interpretive
approach was well-received by circuit courts, but the BIA
nevertheless began to move away from it.111 Eventually, in 2014,
the BIA added two new criteria. Now, in addition to being defined
by a fundamental or immutable characteristic, a particular social
group must be "socially distinct" and possess "particularity."1 2
This new framework has largely been accepted by the circuit
courts, although not without some efforts to limit its impact or to
require further case-by-case adjudication."13 As Fatma Marouf
noted, the BIA itself has struggled to provide consistent and
coherent guidance about how the criteria should be applied."4
In 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a major
decision, Matter of A-B-.115 Attorney General Sessions largely
affirmed the BIA's new test for a particular social group but
rejected a precedent decision that allowed asylum claims from
women fleeing domestic violence.116 Attorney General Sessions
rejected the somewhat convoluted way the BIA had previously
analyzed domestic violence cases but did not offer direction about
the kind of asylum claims that might succeed."7 In fact, by
discarding a convoluted but constraining BIA precedent, Attorney
General Sessions may have opened the door for some immigration
judges to use a simpler and broader definition of asylum eligibility.
The Attorney General rejected a social group defined as "married
women who are unable to leave the relationship," but some
immigration judges have since decided that domestic violence
108. See Marouf, supra note 21, at 489-90 (tracing the evolution of BIA jurisprudence).
109. Id. at 489.
110. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
111. See discussion infra Section V.D.
112. See Marouf, supra note 21, at 490.
113. See Anker, supra note 13, § 5:43.
114. Marouf, supra note 21, at 490-91.
115. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 316 (Att'y Gen. 2018), overruling Matter of A-
R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 338 (B.I.A. 2014).
116. Id. at 330-31, 333.
117. Marouf, supra note 21, at 492.
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victims might instead be persecuted simply because they are part
of the particular social group of "women," full stop.118 The Attorney
General also appeared to raise the standard for asylum when
people flee harm from nonstate actors. Whereas the
well-established rule was that the asylum-seeker must show that
her government was merely unable or unwilling, 119 Matter of A-B-
says that "[t]he applicant must show that the government
condoned the private actions 'or at least demonstrated a complete
helplessness to protect the victims."' 120 As I will discuss in Part
VIII, the D.C. Circuit and, to a lesser extent, other circuits have
seen this "complete helplessness" standard as new and
significantly different.121
In a number of respects, Matter of A-B- was as much an
example of political rhetoric as it is a precedent decision offering a
legal interpretation. Attorney General Sessions offered a lengthy
decision expressing skepticism about asylum claims based on fears
of criminal actors, but this may be entirely dicta.122 In line with
Sessions's public rhetoric on asylum and immigration,123 he
seemed to lecture asylum-seekers:
[T]here are alternative proper and legal channels for seeking
admission to the United States other than entering the
country illegally and applying for asylum in a removal
proceeding.... Aliens seeking an improved quality of life
should seek legal work authorization and residency status,
instead of illegally entering the United States and claiming
asylum.124
The restrictive view of asylum eligibility in Matter of A-B- was in
sync with the Trump Administration's generally hostile and
restrictive view of these migrants.125 Narrowing eligibility for
118. Id. at 513-14.
119. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985).
120. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 337 (Att'y Gen. 2018) (quoting Galina v. INS,
213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000)).
121. See discussion infra Part VIII.
122. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 343 ("No country provides its citizens with
complete security from private criminal activity, and perfect protection is not required.").
123. See, e.g., Richard Gonzales, Sessions Says 'Zero Tolerance' for Illegal Border
Crossers, Vows to Divide Families, NPR (May 7, 2018, 8:17 PM), https://www.npr.org/sectio
ns/thetwo-way/2018/05/07/609225537/sessions-says-zero-tolerance-for-illegal-border-cross
ers-vows-to-divide-families [https://perma.cc/UA9V-KSVA].
124. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 345.
125. See, e.g., Dara Lind, Trump Wants to Make Asylum Seekers' Stay in the US




asylum makes it easier to deport these asylum-seekers. It also
bolsters public rhetoric arguing that they never had valid asylum
claims anyway, although that claim depends on what should even
be considered a valid asylum case.126 This complementarity might
be a compelling argument for giving the Executive Branch space
to interpret ambiguous statutes in line with the President's policy
agenda. But it might equally be a reason for concern that
adjudication has been politicized, which might be a reason for
federal courts to scrutinize decisions more rigorously.127 I will
discuss this concern in more detail in Part VII.
Attorney General William Barr also issued a precedent
decision on the definition of membership in a particular social
group.128 Since 1985, the BIA had embraced "family" as a
quintessential example of a particular social group.129 The full
reach of this understanding was often contested, so the BIA raised
caution that the validity of a family group may depend on "the
nature and degree of the relationships involved and how those
relationships are regarded by the society in question."130 The BIA
reaffirmed the essential validity of family-based refugee claims as
recently as 2017.131 In July 2019, however, Attorney General Barr
overruled that decision and issued a holding at odds with decades
of established law, finding that "in the ordinary case, a nuclear
family will not, without more, constitute a 'particular social
group."'132 The Attorney General acknowledged that several circuit
courts held that family ties can in fact define a particular social
group.133 The Ninth Circuit, for example, found that "there is
nothing in the statute itself, nor in the BIA's interpretation of the
relevant provisions, to suggest that membership in a family is
126. See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, OUR NATION'S WEAK ASYLUM LAWS ARE
ENCOURAGING AN OVERWHELMING INCREASE IN ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION (Nov. 1, 2018), https
://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/nations-weak-asylum-laws-encoura
ging-overwhelming-increase-illegal-immigration/ [https://perma.cc/7WZU-QCRG] (citing
low final grant rates in asylum claims as a reason to reform asylum policy).
127. See generally Barnett, supra note 65, at 1023 (arguing that "challenges to
adjudicators' appearance of partiality are well positioned to be part of the new wave of
structural challenges to the administrative state").
128. Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- II), 27 I. & N. Dec. 581, 589 (Att'y Gen. 2019).
129. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
130. Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- 1), 27I. & N. Dec. 40, 43 (B.I.A. 2017), rev'd, 27 I. & N.
Dec. 581 (Att'y Gen. 2019).
131. Id.
132. L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 589.
133. Id. ("I also recognize that certain courts of appeals have considered the requisite
elements of a 'particular social group' and ... have nonetheless suggested that shared
family ties alone are sufficient to satisfy the INA's definition of 'refugee' .... ").
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insufficient, standing alone, to constitute a particular social group
in the context of establishing eligibility for asylum."134
The Attorney General argued that the circuit courts had
gotten this wrong and that some of their decisions had been
undermined by later caselaw.135 But he did not rely on this claim
alone. He argued that he had the authority to replace the circuit
courts' interpretations with his own, first because Congress had
explicitly delegated interpretation of the Immigration and
Nationality Act to the Attorney General,136 and second because of
Chevron deference.137 He stressed Brand X deference because it
requires Chevron deference "even in cases where the courts of
appeals might have interpreted the phrase differently in the first
instance."138 Barr's reason for preemptively, and perhaps a bit
defensively, citing Brand X is clear, given that he was critiquing
courts that have the potential to invalidate his decision. As of early
October 2019, no circuit had issued a decision reviewing the
Attorney General's decision in Matter of L-E-A-.139 However, the
Fifth Circuit-which had actually never reviewed family as a
social group-already noted in dicta: "Matter of L-E-A- is at odds
with the precedent of several circuits."140 If Attorney General
Barr's new interpretation had any prospect for surviving judicial
scrutiny, it would seem to be only because Chevron deference
would be applied with maximal force. Meanwhile, on December 11,
2020, the Executive Office of Immigration Review (which
supervises the Immigration Courts) and the Department of
Homeland Security published sweeping new regulations, after a
notice-and-comment period, codifying the most restrictive reading
of Matter of A-B-.141 The new regulations were set to go into force
134. Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1188-89 (9th Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S.
183 (2006).
135. L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 590.
136. Id. at 591 (providing that "determination and ruling by the Attorney General with
respect to all questions of law shall be controlling" under the INA (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103(a)(1))).
137. Id. at 591-92 ("Congress thus delegated to the Attorney General the discretion to
reasonably interpret the meaning of 'membership in a particular social group,' and such
reasonable interpretations are entitled to deference." (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984))).
138. Id. at 592 (citing Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 980 (2005)).
139. Cf. Perez-Sanchez v. Att'y Gen., 935 F.3d 1148, 1158 n.7 (11th Cir. 2019)
(declining to review the validity of Matter of L-E-A- on the facts of the case presented).
140. Pena Oseguera v. Barr, 936 F.3d 249, 251 (5th Cir. 2019).
141. See Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and
Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 80274, 80280-81 (Dec. 11, 2020) (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1208, 1235).
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on January 11, 2021, just days before the inauguration of a new
president, but were enjoined by a district court because they were
approved by Chad Wolf, who was improperly installed as Acting
Secretary of Homeland Security.142
IV. DEFERENCE IN CIRCUIT-LEVEL ASYLUM CASES
Measuring the true practical impact of Chevron requires a
search for a very particular sort of case. As a rule, requiring
deference from the judiciary, such as Chevron deference, should
make it easier for the government to win when an agency's legal
interpretation is challenged. But the government would win many
cases when its interpretation of legislation is challenged anyway,
even under de novo review. Moreover, even under a robust
application of Chevron, the government should not always win
because Chevron does not call for an affirmance when the statute
is clear or the agency's interpretation of it is unreasonable.
Chevron's true impact thus appears in a very specific kind of
decision. It comes in cases where the agency is not clearly wrong,
but not clearly right, either. Chevron matters in cases where the
court might have ruled the other way if not for deference. Courts
do not say this very often. In fact, I do not know of any ideal-type
example in immigration law in which a court directly says, "I think
the agency is wrong, and I would have ruled the opposite way
under de novo review, but only because of the deference required
I will affirm." But some recent cases litigating the boundaries of
the asylum definition hint at this.
A case where Chevron appeared to have been decisive is the
2018 Third Circuit decision, S.E.R.L. v. Attorney General.143 The
petitioner was a Honduran woman whose daughter had already
been granted asylum because the daughter had been abducted,
raped, and stalked by two men, including her stepfather.14 4 The
mother feared they would abuse her too.14 5 The Immigration Judge
found her account of the facts to be credible, although the IJ
quibbled some about how much the mother had actually been
abused in the past. 146 Regardless, the crux of the case was whether
"S.E.R.L.'s proposed particular social group-immediate family
142. Pangea Legal Servs. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 20-CV-09253, 2021 WL
75756, at *2-6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2021).
143. S.E.R.L. v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 894 F.3d 535 (3d Cir. 2018).
144. Id. at 540.




members of Honduran women unable to leave a domestic
relationship-lacked the requisite particularity and social
distinction" to be considered a "particular social group" for
purposes of asylum.147 The dual requirement that an asylum
applicant show that the proposed group is particular and socially
distinct was, at that time, a departure from the long-standing test
used by the BIA, known as the Acosta test, which had required
that a particular social group be "a group of persons all of whom
share a common, immutable characteristic."148
S.E.R.L. was decided in 2018, but by that time the circuit
courts had been battling with the Board of Immigration Appeals
about the definition of a particular social group for more than a
decade. The BIA had taken steps to transform the Acosta test by
2006.149 But its initial attempts did not fare well in all circuits,
including in the Third Circuit.150 Much of this concerned the BIA's
attempts to impose a "social visibility" requirement, which several
circuit courts had found to be inconsistently and unclearly defined
in the Board's own caselaw.151 The Board persisted, issuing two
precedent decisions in 2014 that refined the criteria.15 2 In these
cases, the Board replaced its failed "social visibility" test with a
new "socially distinct" criteria. Now, an applicant for asylum must
show that she is persecuted on account of membership in a group
that is "(1) composed of members who share a common immutable
characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially
distinct within the society in question."53 The BIA also clarified
that "particularity" meant that the group must have "definable
boundaries."154 "Social distinction" meant not literal "visibility"
but rather "whether the people of a given society would perceive a
proposed group as sufficiently separate or distinct."155
For purposes of this Article, the important question is the role
that Chevron played in the circuit courts' treatment of the BIA's
evolving approach. In S.E.R.L., the Third Circuit followed a
147. Id. at 541-42.
148. Id. at 544 (quoting Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att'y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 595 (3d Cir.
2011) (quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34 (B.I.A. 1985))).
149. Id. at 545-46.
150. Id. at 546 & n.12 (citing Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 603-09) (summarizing
national litigation about the BIA's interpretation during this period).
151. Id. at 546-47.
152. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of W-G-R-, 26
I. & N. Dec. 208, 212 (B.I.A. 2014).
153. Matter of M-E-V-G-, I. & N. Dec. at 237.
154. Id. at 239.
155. Id. at 240-41.
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textbook Chevron two-step analysis. The particular social group
requirement was not clearly defined in the statute.156 The BIA's
new interpretation is reasonable and so it was affirmed.157 But the
most telling part of the decision may be the way the court treated
the petitioner's arguments against the Board's new standard:
primarily, that the BIA had not meaningfully refined an
interpretation that had already been rejected; that it was acting
inconsistently in different cases; and that it had acted against
well-tested canons of construction.5 8 The court said, "Those
critiques raise legitimate concerns."159 The court examined the
critiques extensively.160 But the court concluded:
"[N]otwithstanding our concerns, we conclude that the
requirements are reasonable and warrant Chevron deference."'6 '
This language-notwithstanding our concerns-is as strong an
indication as we will ever normally find that Chevron deference
was decisive to the outcome. The court is signaling openly that it
is sympathetic to critiques of the government's new interpretation
of the statute, but it is good enough for Chevron Step Two. Or, put
another way, had this been de novo review, or maybe even
Skidmore deference, the court might have ruled the other way.
The Third Circuit's doubts about the Board's interpretation
do not seem to be unique. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the same
BIA interpretation under a Chevron analysis.62 The Ninth Circuit
did not communicate concerns about it as openly as the Third
Circuit, but it found the BIA's interpretation to be reasonable only
after attaching to it a number of caveats about the degree to which
it was really new.63 The Seventh Circuit has apparently withheld
judgment.164
Two caveats are worth noting. First, it should come as no
particular surprise that the circuit courts apply Chevron deference
156. S.KR.L., 894 F.3d at 549.
157. Id. at 555.
158. Id. at 549-50.
159. Id. at 550.
160. Id. at 549-55.
161. Id. at 550.
162. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1135 (9th Cir. 2016).
163. See, e.g., id. at 1135-36 ("The BIA's statement of the purpose and function of the
'particularity' requirement does not, on its face, impose a numerical limit on a proposed
social group .... Nor is it contrary to the principle that diversity within a proposed
particular social group may not serve as the sine qua non of the particularity
analysis.... The 'social distinction' requirement is not, as Garay contends, a 'new'
requirement." (citation omitted)).
164. See Melnik v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 278, 286 n.22 (7th Cir. 2018).
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with more consistency and rigor than does the Supreme Court.165
In some circuits, Chevron deference in immigration cases has a
superficially separate life from Supreme Court caselaw, such that
Chevron is not even cited in cases that clearly invoke the doctrine
that we know as Chevron deference. This is the case in the Eighth
Circuit, for example. Sometimes, the circuit will specifically state
that it is applying Chevron.166 But other times, it cites to its own
caselaw.167 This is to a large extent a formality, but it indicates
symbolically the degree to which Chevron in the circuits is
different from the Supreme Court. A second caveat is this: The
government does not necessarily need Chevron to win in asylum
cases. In nearly all of these cases, once the court affirms the
Board's general framework of what may constitute a particular
social group, it then examines whether the specific proposed group
in that case could qualify.168 The Eleventh Circuit recently decided
a case in which it was unsure whether Chevron applied to a
single-member Board decision but resolved in the alternative that
the proposed group would fail under any interpretation of the
statute. 169
Given this backdrop, it is not surprising that Matter of A-B-
has fared well under Chevron analysis in the circuit courts.170 And
yet, while Matter of A-B- has generally been affirmed under
Chevron, it has also been somewhat minimized. For example, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed Matter of A-B-, but only after stating that it
does not categorically exclude all domestic-violence-based asylum
claims and stating that "A-B- [does] not constitute a change in
policy" because it relied on "standards firmly established in BIA
165. See Barnett & Walker, supra note 41, at 17-18.
166. See, e.g., Cinto-Velasquez v. Lynch, 817 F.3d 602, 606 (8th Cir. 2016) ("[We give
Chevron deference to the BIA's reasonable interpretation of this ambiguous statutory
phrase."); De Guevara v. Barr, 919 F.3d 538, 540 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting the same).
167. See, e.g., Muiruri v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 984, 986 (8th Cir. 2015) ("[T]he BIA's
interpretation of immigration laws and regulations receives substantial deference.") (citing
Habchy v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 858, 862 (8th Cir. 2006)); Bernal-Rendon v. Gonzales, 419
F.3d 877, 880 (8th Cir 2005) (holding the court would "accord substantial deference to the
BIA's interpretation of immigration law and agency regulations") (first citing Tang v. INS,
223 F.3d 713, 718-19 (8th Cir. 2000); and then citing Ikenokwalu-White v. INS, 316 F.3d
798, 804 (8th Cir. 2003)).
168. See Anker, supra note 13, § 5:43.
169. Perez-Zenteno v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 913 F.3d 1301, 1308-10 (11th Cir. 2019).
170. See, e.g., Del Carmen Amaya-De Sicaran v. Barr, 979 F.3d 210, 213-14, 216 (4th
Cir. 2020); Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2020); Gonzales-Veliz v.
Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 235 (5th Cir. 2019).
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precedents."171 The Ninth Circuit also affirmed Matter of A-B- but
dismissed much of the Attorney General's decision as rhetorical
rather than a legal text.172 I will return to this tendency of courts
to affirm while also minimizing administrative action when I
address arbitrary-and-capricious review in Part VIII.
Chevron deference in asylum cases is notable for two main
reasons. First, on this subject, the circuit courts are acting in line
with Supreme Court tendencies, not in contrast to them. As we
have already seen, the Supreme Court has avoided Chevron in
grounds-of-removal cases, but it has more consistently applied it
in asylum cases. Second, Chevron seems to be deciding high-stakes
cases at a time when its standing at the Supreme Court is in doubt.
The Third Circuit stated this openly, in one of the several passages
of its decision that seemed to signal misgiving about the legal
interpretation that it affirmed: "The Chevron doctrine of deference
to federal agencies is open to question, but it is the law, and it
allows the BIA to change its statutory interpretation and still be
entitled to full deference from Article III courts."173
V. WHY DEFER IN ASYLUM CASES?
So far, my main point has been observational. Chevron does
not seem to matter much in cases about immigration detention
and grounds of removal, but it matters a lot in other immigration
cases and has been decisive in some extremely high-stakes circuit
cases about the boundaries of asylum law. The next question is
normative: Is this pattern defensible?
The Supreme Court has said that Chevron deference should
apply in all immigration cases.174 But given the Court's divergent
behavior, a baseline question is whether the Supreme Court has
effectively stated its own rule in overly broad terms. Applying
Chevron in all immigration cases is not what the Supreme Court
has actually done. In my previous study of this issue, I argued that
171. Gonzales-Veliz, 938 F.3d at 232-34; see also De Pena-Paniagua v. Barr, 957 F.3d
88, 93 (1st Cir. 2020) (affirming that Matter of A-B- does not categorically change asylum
law).
172. Diaz-Reynoso, 968 F.3d at 1079-80 ("We recognize that the Attorney General
began the opinion in Matter of A-B- by offering some general impressions about asylum and
withholding claims .... But the holding of Matter of A-B- plainly does not endorse any sort
of categorical exception .... ").
173. S.E.R.L. v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 894 F.3d 535, 554-55 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
174. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516 (2009) ("[T]he BIA is entitled to
deference in interpreting ambiguous provisions of the INA.").
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nondeference in grounds of removal cases is entirely appropriate
because of a basic separation of powers concern:
If one branch of government infringes a person's physical
liberty (either by detention or deportation) she should have
the right to go before a separate branch of government for an
assessment of whether this action was justified under law.
That is a basic check and balance, a feature of our
constitutional separation of powers. Immigration
enforcement distorts this separation, however. In
immigration, people are arrested, confined behind bars,
judged, and deported all by the executive branch. Chevron
would mean that even in the limited judicial check that
exists on the immense power that the federal government
wields over the physical liberty of individuals, the judiciary
should defer back to the executive branch on questions of
law. This is too much power for one branch of government to
have.175
Of course, separation of powers is the foundation for a broader
attack on Chevron writ large.176 For present purposes, I need not
take a position on this broader attack. If Chevron is invalid in its
entirety, then it is not applicable in immigration cases of any kind
and we need not go any further. My argument is narrower.
Separation-of-powers concerns should be especially heightened
when deportation or detention is at stake, so that even if the
Supreme Court does not overturn Chevron entirely, it is right to
make an exception in these matters.
What, then, do we make of asylum cases? Why should
Chevron play such an outsized role in high-stakes asylum cases
when it does not in other deportation cases? There is a
straightforward argument that they should be treated the same:
Asylum cases are fundamentally about deportation, in that
deportation is what will happen if the government wins in a
petition for review in the federal courts, affirming a denial of
asylum. Moreover, these are deportation cases in which a person
may be subject to grave harm. An argument may be made that, if
anything, given the high stakes, there should be less deference in
asylum cases.
175. Kagan, supra note 2, at 532.
176. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1154 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch,
J., concurring) ("Not only is Chevron's purpose seemingly at odds with the separation of
legislative and executive functions, its effect appears to be as well.").
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The interpretation of the refugee definition involves the
implementation of an international treaty.177 The Supreme Court
has long recognized that statutory eligibility criteria for asylum is
a means of implementing treaty obligations, specifically
obligations under the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees.178 Maureen Sweeney argues that, instead
of Chevron, interpretation of the refugee definition should be
governed by the rule in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy,
which held that courts should avoid statutory interpretations that
clash with international law.179 However, this argument may not
fully resolve the question of whether Chevron should apply. In the
seminal case where it acknowledged the role of international law
in asylum cases, the Supreme Court did not see any reason to
question the applicability of Chevron deference.180 The Charming
Betsy doctrine could be invoked in the course of applying Chevron's
normal analysis, for instance, by resolving statutory ambiguity at
Step One. That would presumably constrain the amount of
deference afforded to the Executive Branch without rejecting the
Chevron doctrine outright.
There are several arguments that may justify Chevron
deference in asylum law, more so than in other immigration cases.
These include formalistic differences between grounds-of-removal
and asylum eligibility, special reasons for deference on matters of
foreign affairs, reinforcing political accountability by deferring to
political branches on policy choices, and expertise. I conclude that
the political-accountability rationale is the most persuasive,
though it raises countervailing concerns about the use of
administrative adjudication to make high-stakes policy choices.
A. Formalism and Proof Burdens
Treating asylum eligibility different from grounds of removal
flows naturally from the structure of removal (deportation)
proceedings. A standard removal case in Immigration Court
begins with the Department of Homeland Security bearing the
burden of proof to show that the respondent is removable from the
177. Sweeney, supra note 20, at 179-87.
178. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437-38 (1987); United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
179. Sweeney, supra note 20, at 184, 186, 188; see also Murray v. Schooner Charming
Betsy (Charming Betsy), 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
180. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448.
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United States.181 The cases where the Supreme Court has avoided
meaningful Chevron deference were decided at this stage. But once
removability is established, the respondent has the opportunity to
ask for relief from removal, of which asylum is one variety.182 The
respondent bears the burden of proof in applications for relief from
removal, which operate in a manner loosely analogous to an
affirmative defense in a criminal case.183
Does the fact that the respondent, rather than the
government, bears the burden of proof justify Chevron deference
in some way? Allocation of the burden of proof is a different issue
than allocation of responsibility for interpreting a statute, and it
is by no means self-evident that one should flow from another. It
is important to remember in this context that the questions that
end up adjudicated in federal appellate cases under Chevron are
questions about legal eligibility. Decisions that are discretionary
are generally outside the courts' jurisdiction entirely, rendering
Chevron irrelevant.184 But the fact that the respondent bears the
burden may yet indicate something important. The reason the
burdens of proof in deportation cases are allocated this way reflect
the fact that, on claims of relief, the respondent is trying to claim
a benefit to which she is not by default entitled. By contrast in
removability, the government is seeking to use force against
someone (to deport them). Asylum in a removal proceeding only
arises when the government has already proven that a person may
be removed from the country and she seeks relief from removal.
Perhaps these differences make deference in relief-from-removal
cases a less direct threat to separation of powers than in
ground-of-removal cases.
The Supreme Court has, in one important and very recent
case, ignored Chevron in adjudicating eligibility for relief from
removal. Pereira v. Sessions concerned cancellation of removal, for
which calculating the length of residence in the United States is
an important criterion.185 The clock on residence in the United
States stops when a removal proceeding begins-known as the
stop time rule. But in Pereira, the Court found that time does not
181. The Shifting Burdens of Immigration Law, 8 IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR (U.S. Dep't Just.
Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev.), Oct. 2014, at 2-3.
182. 8. U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
183. See id. § 1229a(c)(4)(B); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 277, 282, 284-85 (1966)
("[I]t is incumbent upon the Government in such proceedings to establish the facts
supporting deportability by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.").
184. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B).
185. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2018).
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stop if the Notice to Appear that initiated removal proceedings was
not completed properly. The lower court had found the statute
ambiguous, leading to a Chevron analysis.186 The Supreme Court
found clarity in the statute that the lower court could not see, so
"the Court need not resort to Chevron deference, as some lower
courts have done."187 This led to Justice Alito's complaint that the
Court was ignoring Chevron without overruling it188 and to Justice
Kennedy's call for the Court to revisit the validity of Chevron
entirely.189 The fact that this discussion among the Justices
occurred in a relief-from-removal case suggests that this formal
distinction between removability and relief might not be a correct
description of the Court's pattern any longer. But for now, Pereira
is just one data point, and it appears to be an exception. Moreover,
in Pereira, the majority did at least mention Chevron and purport
to make a Step-One decision, which it does not always do in
removability cases.190
It is important to note in this context that the fact that a
respondent bears the burden of proof and the government gets
Chevron deference on the law makes for a very steep hill to climb
for anyone fighting deportation through an asylum application.
The cases where circuit courts actually wrestle with the way the
BIA has construed asylum law are relatively exceptional. Circuit
courts can also affirm asylum denials by deference to findings of
fact, which are upheld if backed by substantial evidence. Circuit
courts often rely on this, even in cases that could raise legal
disputes about the definition of a particular social group.191
186. Id. at 2113-14, 2121.
187. Id. at 2113.
188. Id. at 2121, 2129 (Alito, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 2121 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 2113 (majority opinion); see also Kagan, supra note 2, at 524-28.
191. See, e.g., Paiz-Morales v. Lynch, 795 F.3d 238, 245 (1st Cir. 2015) (rejecting a
proposed particular social group "on the record of this case" only, based on a substantial
evidence standard); Velasquez v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 188, 194, 196-98 (4th Cir. 2017)
(affirming under substantial evidence for lack of nexus to a particular social group); Cruz-
Guzman v. Barr, 920 F.3d 1033, 1038 (6th Cir. 2019) (concluding that "[t]he record does not
compel" finding that the proposed ground caused the fear of persecution); Bernal-Rendon
v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 877, 880-81 (8th Cir. 2005) ("While petitioners correctly contend that
a nuclear family can constitute a social group, petitioners fail to prove that a specific threat
exists to their family as a social group.") (citations omitted); cf. Oliva v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 53,
61 (4th Cir. 2015) (remanding for the BIA to consider all evidence about whether the




A longstanding, but somewhat troubled, argument for
deference is that executive agencies have an advantage over courts
in terms of technical expertise on an area of law.192 The D.C.
Circuit has said that deference to an agency is often "particularly
strong when the [agency] is evaluating scientific data within its
technical expertise."193 On the other hand, Justice Scalia argued
that Skidmore deference is sufficient for courts to take due account
of technical explanations offered by experts, arguing that Chevron
is better justified as a recognition of congressional intent to trust
executive agencies to make policy choices.194 However, these two
rationales are not mutually exclusive. Congress may want to rely
on agencies to make policy choices because they have "'unique
expertise,' often of a scientific or technical nature."195 Thus, to
defer to an agency's expertise may be a way to implement
congressional intent.
Immigration cases rarely involve any kind of scientific
expertise.196 They almost always raise classic problems of fact and
law, which would seem to dilute any claims that an executive body
has a relative advantage compared with courts. That is especially
so when the agency that would get deference operates through
adjudication, using a decision-making process that mirrors those
of a court, with briefing, examination of a record, and reasoned
written decisions.197 Deference sometimes might be justified by the
complexity of a statutory scheme.198 But the theory that the BIA
has more expertise than federal courts on this particular statutory
192. See Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the
Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 948-50, 954-55,
999-1000, 999 n.293 (2011) (discussing historical origins of deference based on technical
expertise). But see Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing at All: The
Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 11 (2013) (critiquing epistemological
expertise as a ground for deference).
193. Int'l Fabricare Inst. v. EPA, 972 F.2d 384, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
194. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 514-16 (1989); Lawson & Kam, supra note 192, at 71-72 (2013);
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 250 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
195. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2413 (2019) (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting
Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991)).
196. See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 17, at 1201, 1218-20, 1222-23; Sweeney, supra
note 20, at 174-75.
197. See Kagan, supra note 2, at 513-17 (critiquing standard arguments for deference
as applied to the BIA).
198. See Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with
Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 352 (1990).
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scheme cannot be accepted without a caveat: The circuit courts of
appeal decide a lot of asylum cases.199 The circuit courts, thus, do
not necessarily lack expertise on the relevant questions of law. We
know that judges tend to become less deferential as they encounter
more and more cases in a particular area of law.200 The
immigration cases where the Supreme Court has seemed most
reluctant to defer have involved interpretations of criminal law
and constitutional due process.201 It would not be surprising for an
Article III court to feel that no other branch of government has an
advantage in resolving such problems. It could be that federal
judges are more willing to defer on the interpretation of asylum
law, which is famously amorphous, than on the interpretation of
federal criminal law. But on the whole, there is good reason to be
skeptical that expertise is a fully convincing reason for disparate
treatment between asylum and grounds of deportation.
C. Foreign Affairs
The application of Chevron in immigration cases flows
naturally from the fact that immigration law is a species of
administrative law. But the fact that immigration touches on
foreign affairs is sometimes offered as an additional reason for
granting Chevron deference.202 In a case about denying a visa to a
would-be immigrant who was still outside the United States, the
Supreme Court said: "Principles of Chevron deference apply when
the BIA interprets the immigration laws. Indeed, 'judicial
deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the
immigration context,' where decisions about a complex statutory
scheme often implicate foreign relations."203
This rationale should not be accepted mechanically, however.
Not all immigration questions invoke foreign policy concerns in a
199. See Fatma Marouf et al., Justice on the Fly: The Danger of Errant Deportations,
75 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 339 & n.2 (2014).
200. See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 177, 183-84 (2010)
(finding that agencies appearing before the D.C. Circuit fewer than ten times from 2000 to
2004 prevailed 80% of the time, compared to 68% for agencies appearing before that court
more than ten times); Wadhia & Walker, supra note 17, at 1221 (stating that circuit courts
are less deferential in immigration adjudication cases than in other administrative
matters).
201. See generally Kagan, supra note 2, at 530, 532, 538-39, 542.
202. See, e.g., S.E.R.L. v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 894 F.3d 535, 549 (3d Cir. 2018); Negusie v.
Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009).
203. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 55-57 (2014) (citations omitted)
(quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)).
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meaningful way.204 But perhaps, this concern does offer a reason
to see asylum and refugee cases differently from removability
cases.
Removability cases often involve the question of whether a
state criminal conviction counts as a ground of removal under
federal immigration law.205 This problem calls for the categorical
approach, assessing whether there is a match between a federal
"generic" definition of a crime and a particular state's definition of
an analogous crime. These cases focus on interpreting American
criminal law and spotlight the federal system of American
government, stressing the interplay between federal law and the
laws of the several states. Yet they do not implicate foreign affairs
in any particularly obvious way, other than the fact that the
respondent is a foreign national. All of the relevant law and facts
are American. If these cases concern foreign affairs, then perhaps
so do a wide variety of common contracts and torts cases that
happen to involve foreign nationals. Asylum cases are different. In
an asylum case, all the relevant facts are about events in a foreign
country. The legal questions are about how to assess the conduct
of foreign actors. These concerns may make the executive's
authority over foreign affairs a more salient concern.
Foreign-affairs concerns offer a possible reason to distinguish
asylum from cancellation-of-removal cases, like Pereira v.
Sessions. Both cancellation and asylum are forms of relief from
removal, but their substantive concerns are very different. While
asylum focuses on persecution in a foreign country, cancellation of
removal is exclusively domestic in orientation.206 One form of
cancellation of removal is for long-term legal residents and is
granted to eligible people as a matter of discretion.207 Another form
of cancellation benefits long-term undocumented residents and
makes its central eligibility criteria a showing of "extremely
unusual hardship" to an American citizen or legal resident, should
204. See Matthew J. Lindsay, Disaggregating "Immigration Law,"68 FLA. L. REV. 179,
182-83, 197 (2016); cf. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018) (noting that a "narrow
standard of review" is appropriate "in admission and immigration cases that overlap with
'the area of national security') (quoting Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015)).
205. See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 187-90, 206 (2013); Mellouli v.
Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1983-84, 1990-91 (2015); Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct.
1562, 1567, 1572-73 (2017).
206. U.S. DEP'T JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW: AN AGENCY GUIDE 2-4 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/
eoiran-agency-guide/download [https://perma.cc/WKG6-GBF2].
207. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
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the respondent be removed from the country.208 This focus on
hardship for Americans (and U.S. legal residents) turns the
spotlight far away from foreign affairs. In a typical
cancellation-of-removal case, the factual inquiry will focus on the
medical or educational needs of a disabled U.S.-citizen child or
parent,209 while an asylum case would focus on whether a police
force in a foreign country is corrupt or repressive.
While there is a close conceptual fit between foreign policy
concerns and asylum law, the case should not be overstated. First,
asylum law is still law. It is not a matter of discretion, and if
Congress had meant it to be tied directly to the foreign policy
concerns of the day, it might have made asylum more
discretionary. We have an example of such an immigration status
in the form of temporary protected status, which is declared by the
Attorney General for particular groups of immigrants.210 But it is
not something for which an individual can petition, unless their
nationality has already been designated.211 A similar example
would be the President's authority to exclude a class of foreigners
from entering the United States, which implicates national
security directly.212 By contrast, asylum law sets out statutory
criteria for eligibility drawn directly from an international treaty,
the 1951 Refugee Convention.213 In a sense, the key foreign policy
choice was to incorporate this treaty into enforceable domestic
immigration law. Once Congress did this, it was debatable
whether shifting foreign policy concerns remained an interpretive
concern. This nexus to an international treaty is an argument for
invoking the Charming Betsy doctrine, which would constrain the
Executive Branch's interpretive leeway and may narrow the scope
of deference available.214
The administrative means by which asylum law is interpreted
and administered also weakens the foreign policy rationale for
208. See id. § 1229b(b)(1).
209. See, e.g., In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 323-24 (B.I.A. 2002)
(considering whether educational opportunities for children can cancel removal); In re
Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 63 (B.I.A. 2001) (stating that caring for elderly
parents or "a qualifying child with very serious health issues, or compelling special needs
in school" may qualify for removal cancellation).
210. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1).
211. See id. § 1254a(a)(1), (c)(1)(A).
212. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2415, 2421 (2018).
213. See Note, American Courts and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: A Need
for Harmony in the Face of a Refugee Crisis, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1400-02 (2018).




deference. The interpretation of the refugee definition is not
handled by the state department or the White House. Instead, it
is interpreted through adjudication, primarily by the Board of
Immigration Appeals, which is supposed to exercise independent
judgment.215 It is not particularly clear why the BIA should be
regarded as having any foreign affairs expertise, nor why its
adjudications should be seen as a vehicle for foreign policy.
Arguably, decisions by the Attorney General, who can overrule the
BIA, may be more clearly tied to the President's agenda. But this
system of adjudication would be put under considerable strain if
the Attorney General appears to be implementing a policy agenda
rather than engaging in neutral adjudication.216 Moreover, the
reliance on adjudication and the use of precedential decisions cuts
down on executive flexibility, which is different from other
immigration cases where the President is free to make quick
decisions related to foreign policy.217
The history of the American asylum system indicates
substantial efforts to shield asylum adjudication from foreign
policy and other political concerns.218 A key innovation of the 1980
Refugee Act, which is the foundation of our asylum system, was
the elimination of ideological limitations on refugee policy.2 19 The
new Act made questions of law, not foreign policy, the central
eligibility criteria and eliminated the Attorney General's
discretion about whether to withhold removal when a person
showed she was in danger of persecution under international
law.220 Circuit courts have, at times, criticized the BIA when it has
appeared overly dependent on state department assessments.221
215. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1), (d)(1)(ii).
216. See Bijal Shah, The Attorney General's Disruptive Immigration Power, 102 IOWA
L. REV. ONLINE 129, 132-34 (2017) (arguing that the Attorney General's unique role in
adjudication would make expansive use of political decision-making problematic).
217. See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2419-20 (noting the President's need "to respond to
changing world conditions") (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976)).
218. See Robert M. Cannon, Comment, A Reevaluation of the Relationship of the
Administrative Procedure Act to Asylum Hearings: The Ramifications of the American
Baptist Churches' Settlement, 5 ADMIN. L.J. 713, 722-23 (1991) ("The determination of
whether an individual fits within the definition of a refugee is meant to be free of
considerations of ideology, foreign policy, and geographic origin.").
219. See Shane M. Sorenson, Note, Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Cardoza-Fonseca: Two Steps in the Right Direction, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 95, 99 (1989).
220. Id. at 104 ("[T]he Refugee Act removed the words 'in his opinion' from section
243(h). This eliminated the Attorney General's discretionary power to withhold
deportation. The Act mandates relief if the statutory requirements of that section are
satisfied.").
221. See Eliot Walker, Asylees in Wonderland: A New Procedural Perspective on
America's Asylum System, 2 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 1, 12-14, 16-18 (2007).
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The asylum system was reshaped in 1990 by the settlement in
American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, known as the ABC
settlement. In the ABC settlement, the government agreed to
issue new regulations, making clear that
foreign policy and border enforcement considerations are not
relevant to the determination of whether an applicant for
asylum has a well-founded fear of persecution [and] the fact
that an individual is from a country whose government the
United States supports or with which it has favorable
relations is not relevant to the determination of whether an
applicant for asylum has a well-founded fear of
persecution.222
The ensuing regulations established a specialized asylum corps,
broadened the evidence that should be considered in asylum
adjudication, and reduced the role of the state department.223 The
Supreme Court has since avoided deciding whether the United
States can deny a refugee claim solely on foreign policy grounds.2 4
All of these measures, with the ABC settlement being most
explicit, suggest that foreign-affairs-motivated interference in
asylum adjudication is actually not a good thing-and, thus, not a
good reason to defer to the outcomes.
D. Policy Choice and Political Accountability
The theory of Chevron's Step Two is that when there are two
or more reasonable interpretations of a statute, the question
depends at least partly on a policy choice.
[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation,
properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of
wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is,
and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices-resolving the
competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of
the statute in light of everyday realities.225
222. Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 799 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
223. See Joan Fitzpatrick & Robert Pauw, Foreign Policy, Asylum and Discretion, 28
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 751, 758 (1992).
224. See id. at 751-52 (discussing INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (1992)).
225. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
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The Third Circuit alluded to such a policy choice in explaining why
the Board of Immigration Appeals abandoned an interpretation of
"particular social group" that had been widely accepted by the
courts:
Eventually, the BIA determined that the Acosta test had
proven to be over-inclusive and unworkable, in part because
it encompassed virtually any past acts or experiences, since
the past cannot be changed and is, by definition, immutable.
Thus, in 1999, the BIA began supplementing the Acosta test
with additional requirements.226
The lynchpin of this shift was the assessment that the prior test
had been over-inclusive. That is, at its core, a policy judgment. A
reasonable person could just as easily conclude that the asylum
definition is meant to be inclusive.
Once it is clear that an interpretive question depends on a
value judgment about the best policy orientation, it may make
sense to allow this judgment to be made by a political branch of
government. Then-Professor Elena Kagan argued that this is often
a reason to allow presidential influence over a decision that does
not require particular expertise.227 Presidential influence over
such decisions establishes transparency and "an electoral link
between the public and the bureaucracy."228 But there are
downsides. For one thing, just because a statute is difficult to
interpret does not mean that the right answer cannot be found nor
that all interpretations are equally valid. Also, as with foreign
affairs, the peculiar structure of immigration adjudication adds
complexity to the policy-choice rationale. The BIA is supposed to
be insulated from politics and the election of a new president does
not immediately change its membership.229 This severely weakens
the argument for direct political accountability as a reason for
deference to the BL4. But here again, the fact that the Attorney
General has preeminence becomes very important. This makes
asylum law potentially quite responsive to political shifts in a new
Administration through the appointment of a new Attorney
General. As Wadhia and Walker argue, the political accountability
226. S.E.R.L. v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 894 F.3d 535, 545 (3d Cir. 2018).
227. Kagan, supra note 36, at 2354.
228. Id. at 2331-32.
229. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) ("Board members shall exercise their independent
judgment and discretion in considering and determining the cases coming before the
Board."); see also Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE
L.J. 1635, 1665 (2010) (stating that BIA members are career appointees).
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theory of Chevron could be more convincing in the immigration
context if the Attorney General engages the public through a
notice-and-comment process.230
VI. THE DILEMMA OF POLITICIZED ADMINISTRATIVE
ADJUDICATION
One of Chevron's key virtues is that it constrains political
partisanship in the federal courts.231 One way that Chevron
arguably accomplishes this is by focusing on the political
accountability of the other branches of government and shifting
responsibility for the difficult choices to them. However, there is
an elephant in the room. The interpretations of statutory law that
have generated the circuit court decisions on the meaning of a
particular social group have been promulgated through
adjudication of individual cases, in which certain cases are
designated as precedents.232 As Wadhia and Walker thoroughly
explore, this is an awkward mechanism by which to apply the
theoretical virtues of Chevron deference.233 Moreover, immigration
adjudication in particular has been the source of considerable
critique and controversy.234
Administrative adjudication is always a strange animal,
especially when adjudication is entrusted to a law enforcement
agency, as it is in immigration cases with the Department of
Justice. This puts an agency, and potentially a single official like
the Attorney General, in a position where he must serve "as both
judge and civil servant."235 This creates tension between the
expectation that adjudication will be impartial and the fact that
the Executive Branch is inherently political.236  Among
230. Wadhia & Walker, supra note 17, at 1230,1232.
231. See Kent Barnett et al., Administrative Law's Political Dynamics, 71 VAND. L.
REV. 1463, 1480-81 (2018).
232. See Jaclyn Kelley-Widmer & Hillary Rich, A Step Too Far: Matter of A-B-,
"Particular Social Group, "and Chevron, 29 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 345, 357-63 (2019)
(discussing the precedential history of interpreting the term "particular social group"). See
generally Wadhia & Walker, supra note 17, at 1210 & n.77, 1211 & n.84, 1212 & n.92.
233. Wadhia & Walker, supra note 17, at 1201-02.
234. See Daniel E. Chand, Protecting Agency Judges in an Age of Politicization:
Evaluating Judicial Independence and Decisional Confidence in Administrative
Adjudications, 49 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 395, 398 (2019) (stating that the controversy over
independence of non-APA judges "is most notable in immigration court, overseen by
immigration judges (IJs), who make up the largest population of non-APA judges").
235. Id. at 395.
236. Cf. Kent Barnett, Regulating Impartiality in Agency Adjudication, 69 DUKE L.J.
1695, 1698-1700 (2020) (arguing that the statutory requirement that administrative law
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administrative adjudicators, immigration judges stand out in that
they work for a prosecuting agency. The Attorney General defends
orders of removal in federal appellate courts, much as a district
attorney would defend criminal convictions on appeal.237
Some scholars have argued that there was a longstanding
assumption that presidents would not assert political control over
adjudication.238 Catherine Kim noted that even advocates of
presidential control over administrative agencies have often seen
adjudication as distinct.239 The idea that deference is warranted
because it leaves space for policy choice, and thus for political
accountability, suggests that it is actually a good thing for
immigration adjudication to be driven by partisan or policy
preferences. But such tendencies are rarely treated as a good
thing.24o
Kim argues that political interference in immigration
adjudication may be in tension with the rule in the canonical cases
of Londoner v. City of Denver and Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v.
State Board of Equalization of Colorado.241 These cases highlight
the importance of a fair hearing when an individual is singled out
for hardship by a government action, which is certainly the case in
a deportation proceeding.242 Full and fair hearings are seen as
essential in deportation and asylum cases; courts have criticized
immigration judges who have indicated otherwise.243 Lower courts
have said that in deportation proceedings "[a] neutral judge is one
of the most basic due process protections."2 "
judges have their impartiality shielded by prohibiting "at-will" dismissal is constitutionally
problematic, but could be accomplished through regulation or executive order).
237. See Chand, supra note 234, at 399.
238. See Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
1163, 1211 (2013).
239. Catherine Y. Kim, The President's Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 1, 35-36
(2018) (noting that Justice Kagan's oft-cited arguments for presidential control over
administration treated adjudication as distinct).
240. See, e.g., Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he IJ behaved
not as a neutral fact-finder interested in hearing the petitioner's evidence, but as a partisan
adjudicator .... ").
241. Kim, supra note 239, at 36-37; see also Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373,
386 (1908); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).
242. Kim, supra note 239, at 36-37.
243. See, e.g., Shoaira v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 837, 842-43 (8th Cir. 2004) ("[N]ear the
beginning of the hearing, the IJ said, 'I am one of those judges that is not the least bit
interested with the process. I don't care about the procedure. I don't care about the process
here. It's all for show.' Taken in isolation and coming from a judge, this language is
deplorable." (citation omitted)).




When agencies act as adjudicators, they often appear to be
mirroring the procedures of the judiciary, which is a natural
response to demands that they show impartiality. This is certainly
the case in immigration adjudication, where the adjudicative body
is called a court, although it is part of the Department of Justice,
and it uses an adversarial process with motions, briefs, and
judge-issued decisions that, in function, look much like a trial level
court.2 45 The BIA and the Attorney General designate certain
decisions as precedents, much the same way as circuit courts of
appeal choose to "publish" some of their opinions to be binding
precedents.246 Courts do this to constrain themselves through the
rule of stare decisis, on the theory that a judicial decision is an
application of rules of law, not political discretion.247 By
constraining its own actions through precedent, the BIA limits the
potential for politics to influence policy and thus undermines one
of the supposed virtues of Executive Branch rulemaking.
If the virtue of Executive Branch decision-making is political
accountability, then imitating the judiciary through the use of
precedent would seem counterproductive. Reliance on precedent
in the Executive Branch constrains the President's agenda.248 A
new Administration that wants to change policy through
adjudication has options, as President Trump's Attorneys General
have shown. The most straightforward mechanism would be for a
new Attorney General to refer a new case to him or herself, and to
issue a new precedent decision, reversing the old precedent. That
is what Attorney General Barr did with Matter of L-E-A-. But
there is another potential route. A new administration might be
able to discard an old rule with which it disagrees by simply
declining to ask a reviewing court to apply Chevron deference.249
Some scholars have questioned whether agencies should actually
245. Cf. Merrill, supra note 192, at 999, 1002 (arguing that the appellate review model
for agency rulemaking may invite too much judicial intervention, on the theory that the
adjudication looks much like the judicial trial system).
246. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g).
247. See Michael Kagan et al., Invisible Adjudication in the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
106 GEO. L.J. 683, 701 (2018).
248. Amy Semet, An Empirical Examination of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 103
MINN. L. REV. 2255, 2260 (2019) ("[W]hen agencies rely on precedent to the exclusion of
other tools, agencies may abdicate their responsibility to be democratically accountable by
failing to fully consider [policy concerns].").
249. See James Durling & E. Garrett West, May Chevron Be Waived?, 71 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 183, 193 (2019); Glob. Tel*Link v. FCC, 866 F.3d 397, 407-08 (D.C. Cir. 2017);
Aaron L. Nielson, D.C. Circuit Review - Reviewed: A New Step for Chevron?, YALE J. ON




be allowed to waive Chevron deference because this can become a
means to circumvent regular decision-making processes.2 0
However, for now, this appears to be a potentially viable route.
The constitutional appropriateness of non-Article III
adjudication rests on the Supreme Court's longstanding view that
Congress may delegate to the Executive Branch adjudication of
"public rights" cases that deal with the relationship between the
government and individuals subject to its authority.251
Christopher J. Walker notes that "political control over agency
adjudication that implicates core life, liberty, or property interests
potentially raises due process concerns."252 One response to this
problem would be to transfer as much adjudication as possible to
Article III courts, but this is an ambitious proposition.253 Walker
suggests that a more modest solution might be to strip
adjudicatory decisions of Chevron deference, which would, in
effect, mean that agency heads-like the Attorney General-
would be restrained from using adjudication of individual cases to
make major policy decisions.25 4 He observes that this might be a
way of implementing Chief Justice Roberts's view that the
public-rights doctrine should be limited to administrative
adjudicators who are "adjuncts" to the federal courts, in that their
role would be limited mostly to findings of fact.255 This approach
would seem to reverse the rule in Chenery II that adjudication can
be a means of establishing generally applicable rules.256 President
Trump's former White House Counsel Don McGahn called for just
that.257
Wadhia and Walker argue that deference on interpretation of
immigration law is more justified when Administrations use the
rulemaking process rather than adjudication.258 This might open
up asylum law to more public engagement through the
250. See Durling & West, supra note 249, at 191-92.
251. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932).
252. Christopher J. Walker, Constitutional Tensions in Agency Adjudication, 104 IOWA
L. REv. 2679, 2680 (2019).
253. Id. at 2688.
254. Id. at 2691-93.
255. Id. (discussing Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 489 n.6 (2011)); see also Kim,
supra note 239, at 41-42 (noting the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts);
Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1983).
256. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1947).
257. See Aaron L. Nielson, D.C. Circuit Review - Reviewed: "I Vote for Chenery I, Not
Chenery II,"YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.yalejreg
.com/nc/d-c-circuit-review-reviewed-i-vote-for-chenery-i-not-chenery-ii/ [https://perma.cc/T
V8H-PFVE].
258. Wadhia & Walker, supra note 17, at 1202, 1224-26.
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notice-and-comment process.259  The Trump Administration
engaged rulemaking to restrict asylum eligibility for people who
transit through third countries before seeking protection in the
United States,260 and in its final days, on the entire scope of
asylum eligibility. 261  Some judges faulted the Trump
Administration for not going through notice and comment with
earlier high-stakes changes in asylum policy.26 2
Going through notice and comment rather than relying on
adjudication could strengthen arguments in favor of deference by
utilizing a process more open to the public. However, favoring
rulemaking over adjudication would put stress on a different
question: Should statutory interpretation be a fundamentally
political exercise, or should it be independent, analytical, and
fundamentally judicial?
VII. IS POLITICIZATION A VIRTUE OR VICE?
Much seems to depend on whether politicization of statutory
interpretation is really a good thing. In theory, a benefit of having
an agency head closely supervise adjudication is that it encourages
consistency and control across disparate adjudicators.2 3 However,
in the immigration context, the Attorney General's personal
involvement in adjudication is not necessary to establish
consistent rules since the Board of Immigration Appeals can issue
precedent decisions of its own that are binding on all Immigration
Courts. What the Attorney General's involvement adds is politics.
The Attorney General is a cabinet-level appointee of the President.
By contrast, the BIA is actually designed to be explicitly insulated
from politics.26 4 If political accountability is a good reason for
courts to defer to an agency, then the intervention of the Attorney
259. See id. at 1232; Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating
that notice-and-comment procedures "reintroduce public participation and fairness to
affected parties after governmental authority has been delegated to unrepresentative
agencies").
260. Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33829, 33829-30
(July 16, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 1003, 1208).
261. Procedures for Asylum and Bars to Asylum Eligibility, 85 Fed. Reg. 67202,
67202-03 (Oct. 21, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 1208).
262. See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922, 947-51 (N.D. Cal.
2019) (finding exceptions to notice and comment inapplicable), injunction stayed in part by
934 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2019), stayed in full by 140 S. Ct. 3 (2019).
263. Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency
Adjudication, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 141, 175-77 (2019); Wadhia & Walker, supra note 17, at
1233 (arguing that national uniformity is a virtue).
264. See Kagan, supra note 2, at 516-17.
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General should make the argument for deference stronger. The
same could be said for making major changes to asylum eligibility
through rulemaking. If the real goal is to enhance political
accountability for statutory interpretation, this kind of
intervention in asylum law would be healthy. If the voters do not
approve, in theory they can express their will through the ballot.
But to make statutory interpretation a partisan, rather than
judicial, endeavor may be fraught with significant downsides.
Trump-era interventions by the Attorney General in the
Immigration Courts have made increasingly urgent the question
of whether reinterpretation of asylum law, among other major
immigration law issues, by political appointees is a good thing. In
addition to narrowing asylum eligibility criteria, President
Trump's Attorneys General have asserted control over the way
immigration judges (IJs) manage their dockets procedurally.
Catherine Kim and Amy Semet's empirical study of immigration
court adjudication suggests that IJs are more likely to order
removal under the Trump Administration that in prior
administrations, regardless of which President originally
appointed the IJ.265 Trump's Attorneys General curtailed
immigration judges' leeway to grant continuances.266 They limited
IJs' authority to terminate cases2 67 and to administratively close
them.268 Attorney General Jeff Sessions spoke of the immigration
courts as a tool of the Trump Administration's overall enforcement
strategy.269 There have been claims that the Administration is
using ideology as a factor in hiring new immigration judges.
270
These interventions attracted considerable criticism.271
During the Trump Administration, aggressive interventions
in immigration and asylum adjudication by the Attorney General
put new pressure on the already difficult question about the role
265. Catherine Y. Kim & Amy Semet, An Empirical Study of Political Control over
Immigration Adjudication, 108 GEO. L.J. 579, 606-07, 621 (2020).
266. Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 405, 413, 419 (Att'y Gen. 2018).
267. See Matter of S-0-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 462, 463, 468 (Att'y Gen. 2018).
268. Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 293 (Att'y Gen. 2018).
269. Jeff Sessions, Att'y Gen., Remarks Announcing the Department of Justice's
Renewed Commitment to Criminal Immigration Enforcement (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.j
ustice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-announcing-depart
ment-justice-s-renewed [https://perma.cc/7HYE-L9PM] ("[W]e will secure this border and
bring the full weight of both the immigration courts and federal criminal enforcement to
combat this attack on our national security and sovereignty.").
270. Fatma E. Marouf, Executive Overreaching in Immigration Adjudication, 93 TUL.
L. REV. 707, 728-29 (2019).
271. See, e.g., id. at 729; Kim, supra note 239, at 43-45.
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of policy preferences in asylum cases. While the Attorney General
has long had the power to adjudicate high-stakes cases rather than
leave them to the BIA, not every Attorney General has done so to
the same degree and there is considerable debate about whether it
is a good thing.272 Regardless, it is clear that President Trump's
Attorneys General are using this authority to its fullest extent.273
It has long been clear that immigration judges are mere
"employees" of the Department of Justice, but the trappings and
procedures of the immigration courts blurred this classification,
allowing the immigration courts to look and function much like a
regular court.274 But recent changes have challenged that,
including a number of new requirements that immigration judges
manage their dockets in particular ways and the decision to
remove tools that the judges had to delay close cases without
issuing a removal order. These interventions have raised public
concern about the neutrality of the immigration courts.27
Of particular relevance here are the interventions of Attorney
General Jeff Sessions in asylum law, which were rhetorical as well
as substantive. While he was Attorney General, Sessions made
two speeches to immigration judges in the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR) in which he used rhetoric deriding
asylum claims, and asylum-seekers' attorneys, in terms that are
difficult to imagine coming from a judge in an Article III court. In
one, he said that "caselaw . .. has expanded the concept of asylum
well beyond Congressional intent" and that "[w]e also have dirty
immigration lawyers who are encouraging their otherwise
unlawfully present clients to make false claims."276 In another, he
spoke to a group of new immigration judges, complaining that
272. See Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch
Immigration Policy Through the Attorney General's Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV.
841, 894-98 (2016).
273. See Dara Lind, Jeff Sessions Is Exerting Unprecedented Control over Immigration
Courts-by Ruling on Cases Himself, Vox (May 21, 2018, 1:06 PM), https://www.vox.com/po
licy-and-politics/2018/5/14/17311314/immigration-jeff-sessions-court-judge-ruling [https://
perma.cc/JJG6-Z865].
274. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (2001).
275. See, e.g., Emma Platoff, Immigration Judges Are Expected to Be Impartial. But
They Report to Jeff Sessions, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 15, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribun
e.org/2018/08/15/immigration-judges-report-prosecutors-jeff-sessions-justice-department/
[https://perma.cc/GC9K-GSVB]; Priscilla Alvarez, Jeff Sessions Is Quietly Transforming the
Nation's Immigration Courts, ATLANTIC (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politic
s/archive/2018/10/jeff-sessions-carrying-out-trumps-immigration-agenda/573151/ [https://p
erma.cc/57YL-5EYZ].
276. Jeff Sessions, Att'y Gen., Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review




"[g]ood lawyers, using all of their talents and skill, work every
day-like water seeping through an earthen dam-to get around
the plain words of the INA to advance their clients' interests.
Theirs is not the duty to uphold the integrity of the act."277
Part of these remarks reflects a view that asylum law had
been interpreted too broadly and is the same as the reason the BIA
began narrowing the definition of a particular social group. But
while this may be a defensible (if debatable) legal view, the
assertion that lawyers who argue the opposite position are acting
against the "integrity" of the law and may be "dirty" is a step
beyond the collegiality normally expected in the legal profession.
If this were said by a judge in another context-if, for instance, a
judge hearing criminal cases said that defense lawyers are "dirty"
and that arguments favoring defendants endangered the integrity
of the law-there would be clear arguments that due process was
violated. Circuit courts have reminded immigration judges that
they "must assiduously refrain from becoming advocates for either
party." 278 Due process is violated when an immigration judge
appears to have prejudged the merits of asylum claims.279
Before the election of Donald Trump, Alberto Gonzales and
Patrick Glen argued that the President should make greater use
of the Attorney General's authority to reshape immigration law by
issuing precedential decisions.280  They argued that this
mechanism was more legitimate than executive actions such as
President Obama's Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
program (DACA), "thus may be a less controversial method by
which to advance immigration policy." 281  The Trump
Administration has followed their recommendations and has
successfully illustrated the potential reach of the Attorney
General's power to change the law if courts do not intervene. But
the promise that this mechanism would defuse controversy has not
been borne out. Instead, asylum adjudication has been inserted
into the realm of presidential immigration law, where key policies
are no more stable than the political fortunes of a particular
277. Jeff Sessions, Att'y Gen., Remarks to the Largest Class of Immigration Judges in
History for the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) (Sept. 10, 2018), https://ww
w.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-largest-class-immigr
ation-judges-history [https://perma.cc/648W-66P7].
278. Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 569 (1st Cir. 1999).
279. See Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d 960, 964-65 (9th Cir. 2002).
280. Gonzales & Glen, supra note 272, at 920.
281. See id. at 846-47.
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president or presidential candidate.282 By January 2020, all of the
leading Democratic candidates for President had promised to
reverse Attorney General Jeff Sessions's decisions limiting asylum
eligibility. 283 The most likely result from such politicization is
instability and inconsistency as policies shift with the election
cycles.
The experience of the Trump presidency suggests that
favoring rulemaking over adjudication would only partially
answer the concerns raised by this politicization. On asylum law,
the Trump Administration started with adjudication, with cases
like Matter of A-B-, and ended with rulemaking, especially the
December 11, 2020 publication of the rule that immigrant
advocates dubbed the "death to asylum" regulation.284 It seems
unlikely that the incoming Biden Administration would be under
any less pressure to reverse the policies just because a
notice-and-comment process had taken place. It also seems
entirely foreseeable that in future presidential elections, rival
candidates will continue to promise to tighten or loosen asylum
policies, which will in turn mean that interpretation of asylum law
may change every four years.
The instability that comes with politicization is troubling. It
is one thing for different presidents to exercise discretionary
powers differently. But on refugee law, the instability from one
presidential administration to the next is about the interpretation
of a nondiscretionary statutory text, one that is drawn from an
282. See Michael Kagan, The New Era of Presidential Immigration Law, 55
WASHBURN L.J. 117, 126 (2015).
283. See Read the Full Transcript of ABC News' 3rd Democratic Debate, ABC NEWS
(Sept. 13, 2019, 1:42 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/read-full-transcript-abc-news-3rd-de
mocraticdebate/story?id=65587810 [https://perma.cc/L2AJ-A325] (quoting former Vice
President Biden) ("I would change the order that the president just changed, saying women
who were being beaten and abused could no longer claim that as a reason for asylum."); The
Biden Plan for Securing Our Values as a Nation of Immigrants, JOEBIDEN, https://joebiden.
com/immigration/ [https://perma.cc/D7YJ-NBSA] (last visited Apr. 3, 2021) (calling for
reversing Trump policies that limit "the ability of members of the LGBTQ
community ... from qualifying for asylum as members of a 'particular social group'); A
Welcoming and Safe America for All, BERNIESANDERS, https:/Iberniesanders.com/issues/we
lcoming-and-safe-america-all/ [https://perma.cc/D84D-HYTQ] (last visited Feb. 5, 2021)
("Reverse DOJ guidance to deny asylum claims on the basis of fleeing domestic or gang
violence. . . ."); Elizabeth Warren, A Fair and Welcoming Immigration System, TEAM
WARREN (July 11, 2019) https://medium.coml@teamwarren/a-fair-and-welcoming-immigrat
ion-system-8fff69cd674e [https://perma.cc/J6UJ-B4AX] ("'ll restore President Obama's
promise to extend asylum for those fleeing domestic or gang violence and affirm asylum
protections for gender identity and sexual orientation-based asylum claims.").
284. Jennie Guilfoyle, Trump's 'Death to Asylum' Rule Will Go into Effect Days




international treaty. The Federalist Papers warned against such
instability in the law:
The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more
calamitous. It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be
of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of
their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they
cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be
understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are
promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no
man, who knows what the law is to-day, can guess what it
will be to-morrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but
how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less
fixed?285
This instability might unsettle some judges and make some more
hesitant to defer the legal interpretations of an ever more volatile
Executive Branch. It would seem to invoke Justice Scalia's
warning that statutes should not be rendered chameleons.286
These are reasons to either reject Chevron deference in the context
of asylum law or to at least limit the range of deference afforded
to the Executive Branch.
VIII. Is ARBITRARY-AND-CAPRICIOUS REVIEW A LIMITATION ON
CHEVRON?
In 2020, the D.C. Circuit seemed to respond to concerns about
instability in asylum law. In Grace v. Barr, plaintiffs challenged
the application of Matter of A-B- in credible fear interviews, which
determine whether asylum-seekers at the border will be permitted
to access the full asylum adjudication system.287 The D.C. Circuit
found that Chevron applies easily to the refugee definition because
its key concept of "persecution" is not clearly defined in the
statutory text.288 But while Grace found that Matter of A-B- offered
an interpretation of the statute that was permissible under
Chevron, it nevertheless failed arbitrary-and-capricious review.289
According to the D.C. Circuit, Attorney General Sessions
substantially departed from the longstanding understanding of
asylum eligibility for people who fled persecution by nonstate
285. THE FEDERALIST No. 62 (James Madison or Alexander Hamilton).
286. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005).
287. Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 887, 889-90 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
288. Id. at 897.
289. Id. at 897-98, 900.
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actors.290 Previously in such cases, an asylum-seeker could win, in
part, by showing merely that her government was "unable or
unwilling" to protect her, but under the new interpretation she
would have to show her government "condoned the private actions
'or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the
victims."'291 The D.C. Circuit found this was a significant change,
made without sufficient explanation. Thus, while the Attorney
General's interpretation was not unreasonable for Chevron
purposes, it was an arbitrary-and-capricious change in policy
direction.292
Grace suggests that arbitrary-and-capricious review may be a
significant check on the Executive over and above Chevron
deference. This possibility is intriguing and not entirely new. The
potential for such an analysis is strongly suggested by the
Supreme Court's decision in Encino Motorcars v. Navarro.293 In
that case, the Department of Labor abandoned a "decades-old"
interpretive approach to the regulation of car dealerships and gave
"little explanation" for the change.294 The Court found this failure
to "provide a reasoned explanation for the change" rendered the
new rule arbitrary.295 The Encino Motorcars decision by Justice
Kennedy says that "Chevron deference is not warranted where the
regulation is procedurally defective," in this case because of the
failure to give reasons.296 Yet the Supreme Court in Encino
Motorcars never says clearly if the Department of Labor's rule
could have survived under Chevron but for the failure to give
reasons. As a result, the precise interplay between arbitrariness
review and Chevron is left somewhat unclear.297 At least one
author has argued that there is nothing of importance in Encino
Motorcars since an arbitrary decision is per se unlawful, which
makes Chevron irrelevant.298 But the D.C. Circuit's decision in
290. Id. at 889, 898.
291. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 337 (Att'y Gen. 2018) (quoting Galina v. INS,
213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000)).
292. Grace, 965 F.3d at 900.
293. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125-26 (2016).
294. Id. at 2123.
295. Id. at 2125-26.
296. Id. at 2125 (internal quotations omitted).
297. See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Step Two's Domain, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1456 (2018) ("The Court was not clear as to whether this
arbitrary-and-capricious review for lack of reasoned decisionmaking was part of, or
separate from, Chevron's two steps.").
298. See Adrian Vermeule, Encino is Banal, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT




Grace suggests something more significant. In Grace, the court
struck down a change in interpretation as arbitrary after squarely
holding that it could pass Chevron. Grace is thus clearer than
Encino Motorcars that arbitrary-and-capricious review is fully
independent from Chevron and, in some contexts, more difficult for
the branch to navigate.
The proposition that arbitrary-and-capricious review
meaningfully limits Chevron deference seems to depend on two
possible features of arbitrary-and-capricious review. First, it
would need to be far less deferential than often assumed. This
assumption seems to be consistent with Chief Justice Roberts's
vigorous application of arbitrary-and-capricious review in the
census and DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals), both
high-profile, Trump-era cases that were entangled with intense
immigration-related political struggles.299 The robust form of
arbitrary-and-capricious review evident in these cases has been
seen as a departure from the norm.300 Second, these cases suggest
that arbitrary-and-capricious review may be interested in
different concerns than Chevron deference. Rather than simply
being a different rung on the ladder of higher or lower forms of
deference, this robust form of arbitrary-and-capricious review is
suspicious of sudden changes in policy. Grace, like the census and
DACA cases, involved a significant change in past policy and
practice. Thus, while Chevron asks only if a statutory
interpretation is reasonable when taken in isolation,
arbitrary-and-capricious review may demand compelling
rationales whenever an administration changes policy direction. If
this approach holds, arbitrary-and-capricious review might
become an important, small-c conservative constraint on
Executive power, pushing toward stability and against the
turbulence of highly politicized policymaking.
The D.C. Circuit appears, for now, to be standing alone, but
only to a degree. Other circuits have been reluctant to strike down
299. Dep't of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2561-76 (2019) (finding the decision
to ask about citizenship on the 2020 census failed arbitrary-and-capricious review); Dep't
of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1901-16 (2020) (rescission of
the DACA program failed arbitrary-and-capricious review).
300. See Dep't of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2576 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("For the first time ever, the Court invalidates an agency action solely
because it questions the sincerity of the agency's otherwise adequate rationale."); Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. at 1931 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that the limited reasons offered for rescinding DACA should have been sufficient
under traditional arbitrary-and-capricious review).
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Matter of A-B- under arbitrary-and-capricious review.301 But in so
doing, they, too, indirectly imposed a form of constraint on the
Executive Branch's latitude to change policy too quickly. The D.C.
Circuit found a problem under arbitrary-and-capricious review
because it saw Matter of A-B- as a major change.302 Courts that
have reached the opposite conclusion have tended to minimize the
impact of Matter of A-B-, and thus reasoned that it does not
represent an arbitrary change in policy. For instance, the Fifth
Circuit said, "[B]ecause A-B- did not change any policy relating to
asylum and withholding of removal claims, we reject [the]
argument that A-B- constituted an arbitrary and capricious
change in policy."303  Through this approach,
arbitrary-and-capricious review seems to push courts toward
minimizing the impact of new administrative interpretations of
the law, even when the government prevails.
IX. CONCLUSION
The stakes are incredibly high in asylum cases; claimants are
typically at risk for physical harm of the gravest kind. Circuit
courts have signaled that they might not always affirm limitations
on asylum eligibility were they not required to apply deference.
And while the Supreme Court decides a few of these cases, it has
seemed much more comfortable invoking Chevron deference in
asylum cases than in other kinds of immigration cases, especially
compared to cases concerning grounds of removal and detention.
There are compelling reasons to see asylum cases as more
amenable to deference than other legal questions that determine
whether a person will be deported. This focuses on the nexus to
foreign affairs and the important role asylum policy plays in
migration policy generally. Certainly, in a democracy there is
value in giving voters a greater say in policy choices. If political
accountability is indeed a good reason for courts, to defer, then
politicization of asylum adjudication is not really a problem. But
that seems far too simplistic. Courts are thus likely to be torn
between their inclination to allow space for policymaking and a
well-established commitment to neutral adjudication. There are
301. See, e.g., Del Carmen Amaya-De Sicaran v. Barr, 979 F.3d 210, 217 (4th Cir.
2020); Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 234 (5th Cir. 2019).
302. Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 900 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
303. Gonzales-Veliz, 938 F.3d at 234; see also Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d. 1070,
1080 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that Matter of A-B- is not arbitrary and capricious because it
did not announce a new rule).
2021] 1169
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
statutory and historical reasons to think that politics is actually
not meant to play a major role in asylum cases.304 The central
problem is that political accountability and neutral adjudication
are both potentially positive virtues in an administrative system,
but it is difficult to bring them both to bear at the same time.
It might be thought that deferring to the political branches is
preferred when a question has become more politically fraught.
After all, electoral politics is our primary mechanism for resolving
such policy disagreements. If this argument holds, then deference
makes sense. At he same time, there is a vast difference between
discretionary choices over policy direction and the interpretation
of a statutory text. When an interpretive choice becomes more
politically divisive, letting the Executive Branch interpret a
statute will render the meaning of the text as unstable as the
electoral college. The meaning given to a statute would shift
dramatically, not because Congress enacted a new law but simply
because a new Attorney General interpreted an old statute
differently than the last one. That instability about the meaning
of a statutory text would not serve the rule of law well. While
asylum policy is certainly a hot political issue, the refugee
definition is a pure question of law. While Congress has indeed
delegated legal interpretation of immigration law to the Attorney
General overall, the history of the U.S. asylum system has been to
increasingly insulate the process from politics as much as possible
and to disavow foreign policy concerns as an influence on the legal
interpretation of asylum eligibility. Politicizing this process, and
then deferring to political choices, would insert considerable
instability into a high-stakes area of law and would make
resolution of a question of law depend ultimately on who won the
last presidential election, not on legal analysis.
Courts have many ways to defuse this dilemma. The Supreme
Court could certainly disavow Chevron entirely or in any case
touching on asylum. But that would be the most far-reaching
approach. Courts can also continue to recognize Chevron's role in
asylum cases, while at the same time applying their own
interpretive analysis to the refugee definition at Chevron Step One
so as to limit the space for the Executive Branch to change asylum
policy abruptly. But courts have been willing to grant considerable
deference to the Attorney General on asylum law in the past. If
304. See Sweeney, supra note 20, at 177, 190-91 (arguing that the sensitive nature of
asylum cases, the Department of Justice's identity as a law enforcement agency, and the
unique role of international law in refugee cases counsel against judicial deference).
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that continues, then the scope of American asylum law may shift
radically from one president to the next, even if the statutory text
remains exactly the same.
